Conceptualization and treatment of psychoanalytic envy through Kleinian/Bionian lens by Kolchin-Miller, Maia
Smith ScholarWorks 
Theses, Dissertations, and Projects 
2015 
Conceptualization and treatment of psychoanalytic envy through 
Kleinian/Bionian lens 
Maia Kolchin-Miller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.smith.edu/theses 
 Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kolchin-Miller, Maia, "Conceptualization and treatment of psychoanalytic envy through Kleinian/Bionian 
lens" (2015). Masters Thesis, Smith College, Northampton, MA. 
https://scholarworks.smith.edu/theses/678 
This Masters Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in Theses, Dissertations, and Projects by an authorized 
administrator of Smith ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@smith.edu. 
 Maia Kolchin-Miller 
Conceptualization and 
Treatment of Envy 
through a 
Kleinian/Bionian Lens 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Envy, like so much in psychoanalytic thought, occupies something of a transitional space 
between concept and experience. Colloquially, envy is often used to mean something similar to 
(but worse than) jealousy. Psychoanalytically, the concept/phenomenon/experience is far more 
complex, however; it is something for which there are many causes and for which there can be 
no material cure. In this theoretical study of psychoanalytic envy, the work of Melanie Klein and 
Wilfred Bion are used to develop a conceptualization of envy and formulate recommendations 
for clinical work with the “envious patient.” Case material is used to synthesize their two 
approaches to practice. A Kleinian/Bionian lens may help clinicians to better understand and 
more effectively work with patients who are struggling to soften their shame and guilt, more 
fully integrate their capacities for love and hate, grieve losses and a lack of early containment, 
and, ultimately, build up a strong internal world from which to draw in their continued 
development.  
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
Envy, like so much in psychoanalytic thought, occupies something of a transitional space 
between concept and experience. Colloquially, envy is often used to mean something similar to 
(worse than) jealousy. Psychoanalytically, the concept/phenomenon/experience is far more 
complex: it is something for which there are many causes, and can be no material cure. In this 
study, I explore the psychoanalytic concept of envy through psychoanalytic theory and clinical 
material. What is envy? Why does it happen? What are its effects? And, perhaps most 
importantly, how might envy be effectively treated in the clinical situation?   
 First, why look at envy psychoanalytically? Social worker and psychoanalyst Selma 
Fraiberg spoke of the “inexhaustible treasure” that psychoanalysis brings to the practice of social 
work (1978, p. 104). Psychodynamic social workers Joan Berzoff, Laura Melano Flanagan, and 
Patricia Hertz agree as they quote George Bernard Shaw: “‘For every complex problem there is a 
simple solution—and it is wrong!’” (2011, p. 478). Social work, with its focus on the person in 
their environment and the systems that shape our lives, and psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on 
the unconscious, internal world of individuals, are useful and important when combined; one 
could argue that each misses something without the perspective of the other. Social worker 
William S. Meyer believes, and I tend to agree, that as “market and other forces seek to hurry us, 
stifle us, and strip our work of its humanity, it seems only right that the psychoanalytically 
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informed clinical social worker should take the lead among mental health professionals as 
modern day ‘keepers of the soul’” (2000, p. 366). Unfortunately, both psychoanalytic and social 
work institutions often marginalize or only superficially deal with the importance of external or 
internal worlds, respectively, limiting the effectiveness of practitioners. Social work professor 
Eda Goldstein discusses the challenges and opportunities for psychoanalytic social workers and 
the importance of the two fields influencing one another. She emphasizes the need to “work to 
keep the teaching of contemporary psychoanalytic theories alive in social work education” 
(2007, p. 13).  
This study is an attempt to make a contribution to the growing literature where social 
work and psychoanalysis meet. Envy is a difficult and common clinical issue faced by social 
workers and psychoanalysts alike. In this psychoanalytic study that is accessible to both the 
psychoanalytic and the non-psychoanalytic clinical social worker, I hope to make the concept of 
envy and its treatment understandable and yet, given the necessity of a complex response to 
complex issues, to encourage all of us to “keep the work as complicated as [we] can” (Berzoff et 
al., 2011, p. 478).  
It is in that spirit that I have chosen to focus my study on the work of two great 
psychoanalytic theorists, Melanie Klein and Wilfred Bion. Both are notoriously complex, 
difficult, and rewarding authors who were primarily working clinicians, deeply concerned with 
figuring out how to help their patients get better. Klein was the first psychoanalytic theorist to 
take envy seriously and make it central to her theory (1957). Her work on envy is conceptually 
original and clinically relevant. Bion is the most famous and influential elaborator of Kleinian 
theory (1954, 1956, 1959, 1962). He is both allied with Klein and has close ties to contemporary 
psychoanalysis (Bion was, perhaps, the first intersubjective psychoanalyst). He takes Kleinian 
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envy to a next level in intricacy and clinical importance. Klein and Bion are difficult to read, 
understand, and use clinically, yet their work is incredibly useful and applicable to the clinical 
situation. It is my hope that this study will stand as part of the growing literature making 
complex and important psychoanalytic theories more accessible to psychoanalytically and non-
psychoanalytically trained mental health clinicians alike.   
There are two foundational concepts that run through this study that I would like to 
address in this introduction. One is the idea of psychic determinism, and the other is the model of 
the infant in the adult and the clinical situation. Before beginning to explore envy through 
Kleinian and Bionian lenses, it is important to understand these theoretical premises. 
Psychic determinism is essentially the idea that nothing that happens in the mind is 
random. Psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Salman Akhtar elaborates: “All psychic acts and events 
have causes and meanings. All are determined by, and can be understood in light of, the 
subjective events that preceded them. This applies to seemingly incomprehensible mental 
phenomena and apparently ‘accidental’ occurrences as well” (2009, p. 227). Freud, of course, 
was known for joking that “sometimes a cigar is just a cigar;” the clinician who believes in 
psychic determinism looks for meanings, motivations, and agency in any action or affect but 
does not lose his or her ability to recognize coincidence and chance as well. Both Kleinian and 
Bionian theories operate under the principle of psychic determinism, meaning that they direct the 
clinician to seek the meaning behind thoughts, affects, and behaviors, yet accept that some 
degree of chance or coincidence is possible.  
Perhaps more confusingly, Klein and Bion often refer to the “infant” – sometimes inside 
the child or adult (Klein) or, more generally, as something representing the deepest and perhaps 
truest part of a person. Klein and Bion sometimes refer to “patient” and “infant” almost 
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interchangeably (with the next logical piece being clinician as mother/father/caretaker). 
Kleinian/Bionian analyst James Grotstein clarifies the reason for using the idea of the infant in 
this manner: “The ‘infant’ is a way of designating the abstracted, irreducible, most elemental 
aspect inhabiting the current depths of the psyche in a person of any age. It is the ‘square one’ 
and ‘ground zero’ of ontological and phenomenological experience” (2009, p. 124). The reader is 
challenged to grapple with this (to some degree) ineffable piece of human experience and its 
implications for theory and practice.  
In the chapters that follow, I work to understand psychoanalytic envy in all its 
complexity. First, I discuss in greater depth my conceptualization and methodology for the study 
as a whole. Next, I review the literature on envy, reflecting on the perspectives of many 
clinicians and writers as I consider psychoanalytic envy, its correlates, and its many effects. In 
the following theory chapters, I explore Kleinian and then Bionian theories, focusing particularly 
on the conceptualization of envy and its treatment. Finally, I analyze and synthesize the two 
major theoretical perspectives, using clinical material to show the potential for using Klein and 
Bion together to create a complex and useful conceptualization of envy and a pathway to 
effective treatment. 
In the next chapter I discuss the conceptualization and methodology for this study. I 
review the two theorists I have chosen and consider in more depth why it is I have selected them. 
I note some of strengths and limitations of this theoretical study’s methods, and finally, I look 
ahead to the exposition of envy through Kleinian and Bionian lenses and the meaning of that 
exposition for good clinical social work practice.  
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
Conceptualization and Methodology 
 
“There is a great deal of symbolism of this kind in life, but as a rule we pass it by without 
heeding it. When I set myself the task of bringing to light what human beings keep hidden within 
them, not by the compelling power of hypnosis, but by observing what they say and what they 
show, I thought the task was a harder one than it really is. He that has eyes to see and ears to 
hear may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret.” 
 --Sigmund Freud, 1905, p.77 
 
 
 How can envy be studied? Benedicte Vidaillet, a French psychoanalyst, describes it as a 
“paradoxical emotion” which may produce powerful feelings even as it remains unconscious 
(2008, p. 267). Sigmund Freud, the first theorist of the unconscious, saw the psychoanalyst as a 
mental archaeologist of sorts, one who works in a place where: 
All of the essentials are preserved, even things that seem completely forgotten are present 
somehow and somewhere, and have merely been buried and made inaccessible to the 
subject. Indeed, it may, as we know, be doubted whether any mental structure can really 
be the victim of total destruction. It depends only upon analytic technique whether we 
shall succeed in bringing what is concealed completely to light (1938, p. 380).  
I have chosen psychoanalytic theory, with its unique focus on what is repressed and its firm 
belief that what is unconscious can be the subject of study, as the broad theoretical frame through 
which this theoretical thesis examines envy and its implications for social work practice. 
Psychoanalytic thought began with Freud, but it was developed and changed in significant ways 
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by other psychoanalysts. In this chapter, I will introduce the two psychoanalytic theorists whose 
work I have chosen to use in order to study the concept of envy. I will discuss why I have chosen 
these two particular theorists and how I will use their work to develop a deep understanding of 
envy and its implications for psychoanalytically informed social work treatment.  
Theoretical background – Freud and envy 
 Perhaps any psychoanalytic study that uses two theorists, neither of which are Sigmund 
Freud, must answer the question, “why not?” Let me attempt an answer by describing Freud’s 
two conceptualizations of envy. First, Freud wrote about “penis envy,” in which girls discover 
the male sexual organ and feel lacking in comparison. This idea has been challenged by many 
scholars, and I will not review those arguments here except to mention the idea that penis envy 
might be understood in a different way if one thinks of what the penis represents to both men and 
women in a patriarchal society rather than seeing it as simply a physical organ (Vidaillet, 2008). 
Freud also considered the role of envy in the formation of groups: in children, the older sibling is 
at first envious and hateful toward the younger sibling, until he realizes “the impossibility of his 
maintaining his hostile attitude without damaging himself” and “is forced into identifying 
himself with the other children” (1921, p. 120). Thus, for Freud, envy was solved by group 
identification.   
 We can see that Freud’s conceptualizations of envy contained crucial conceptual 
elements that we will see returning in later theory and yet leave much to be revised and 
discovered. Freud was extremely influential for both the theorists I will discuss here, and we will 
find each theorist using, expanding upon, challenging, and revising his major concepts (not just 
his ideas about envy) in their writing.   
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Theoretical framework – why Melanie Klein and Wilfred Bion? 
 Melanie Klein (1882-1960), a Hungarian who spent much of her adult life in England 
(for a fascinating biography, see Grosskurth, 1986), was the first psychoanalyst to make envy a 
central piece of her theorizing. While aware of and writing about envy for decades in her clinical 
accounts, Klein’s last major work in 1957, Envy and Gratitude, fully explicates her ideas about 
envy. Klein is an obvious choice for any psychoanalytic study of envy. Her theory of envy as 
primitive, stemming from the infant’s relation to the mother as symbolized by the breast, is rich 
and compelling. We will see that Klein’s interpretation of “the relations between objects as the 
psychological content of the mind” (Hinshelwood, 1991, p.13) make her a deeply influential 
“object relations” theorist. Her conceptualization of the mind and its application to a theory of 
envy make Klein a crucial writer on the subject.  
 Wilfred Bion (1897-1979), a British veteran of the First World War who spent time in 
Los Angeles, was perhaps Klein’s most important student and elaborator of her theories (1954, 
1956, 1959, 1962). His interest in understanding the mind’s links with objects and its ability to 
think, and his work on the destructive power of envy on those capabilities, complicated and 
strengthened the clinical relevance of Klein’s work on the subject. Bion’s emphasis on the 
creation of models with which to talk about the systems that create mental health or a lack 
thereof, and the critical role envy plays as a corrosive, denuding force against necessary 
psychological processes make his original work conceptually interesting and clinically useful 
when treating people suffering from envy.  
Theoretical components 
 Klein and Bion, like all good theorists with long careers, changed, developed, and re-
worked their ideas over decades. I will focus here on the concepts in each theory that I think will 
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help to explicate envy and its clinical implications. For the purposes of this study, I will tend to 
use these concepts as they are most useful to understanding envy and its treatment rather than 
tracing the development of each concept over a multi-decade period.  
Melanie Klein 
Klein’s contributions to theory and clinical practice as they relate to the study of envy can 
be broadly put into three categories: her model of mental development, her overarching technical 
and theoretical concerns, and her innovations in technique. I begin with Klein’s model of mental 
development, including her unique picture of infant mental life: the paranoid-schizoid and 
depressive positions, and the object relations, anxieties and defenses they consist of. Using 
Klein’s idea of the infant in the child or adult personality, I explore the ways in which infantile 
and childhood experiences affect the personality throughout the life cycle.  
Next, I investigate some of Klein’s major theoretical concerns: her concepts of phantasy 
and internal objects, the life and death drives, and her revisions of Freud’s super-ego and 
Oedipus complex. I look at her innovative understanding of the way that internal and external 
worlds exist simultaneously and affect one another and her (sometimes sweeping) changes to 
classical psychoanalytic theory.  
Later, I discuss Klein’s groundbreaking play technique for children and the wealth of 
clinical information it made accessible to her. I look at her conceptualization of transference, 
particularly her pioneering use of the analysis of both positive and negative transference. I 
examine Klein’s measure of a successful psychoanalytic treatment, noting the way in which she 
sees psychoanalysis as a way to develop a rich and deep personality, rather than simply cure 
particular symptoms.  
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In Klein’s model of mental development, her theoretical concerns, and her innovations in 
technique, she is developing a wealth of conceptual material which she uses in her final major 
theoretical concept, that of envy (1957). Envy interferes with mental development. It affects and 
is affected by phantasy, the drives, and the super-ego and Oedipus complex. Kleinian technique, 
particularly in its use of phantasy, analysis of the negative transference and defenses, and 
development of a complex relationship between analyst and patient, is applied in particular ways 
to the treatment of the envious patient.   
Wilfred Bion 
 For the purposes of this study, I divide Bion’s work as it relates to the study of envy into 
two periods. In the first, the 1950s papers on psychosis, Bion explored the mental functioning of 
psychotic patients using Kleinian theory. He studied splitting, projective identification, and the 
substitution of thought and action that he observed in his treatment of seriously ill patients. Bion 
began to create theories concerned with the containment of projective identification, attacks on 
links when envy, hatred, and uncontained projective identification are present, and the harm to 
development when these attacks occur.  
In the second period, the book Learning from experience and the paper The psycho-
analytic study of thinking, both published in 1962, Bion became more focused on the analytic 
situation. He began to ask how the analyst observes mental functioning in the clinical situation, 
and how he or she makes sense of what is happening intrapsychically and interpersonally. Based 
on the idea that analysts do not have a common language with which to speak about clinical 
phenomena, Bion worked to develop a set of tools: hypotheses on cognition, and the concepts of 
alpha-function, alpha- and beta-elements, the contact-barrier, and L, H, and K links. These tools 
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are meant to be models that help analysts to think and speak about the clinical phenomena they 
observe.  
In both the 1950s papers on psychosis and the early 1960s work on model-making and 
thinking, Bion deepened and revised Klein’s ideas about envy. Bionian envy can be understood 
through looking at its link with –K (attacks on thinking) and the processes of evacuation and 
denudation. Bion found envy’s effects to be the destruction of feelings and alpha-function, the 
splitting of material and psychical comforts, the impossibility of satisfaction, and the negative 
therapeutic reaction. He suggested that the clinician working with someone with envy must find 
meaning in the lack of meaning, allow for projective identification and the introjection of good 
objects, help the patient to realistically modify conduct, and understand and use transference and 
counter-transference. 
A note on language 
A note to the reader: both Klein and Bion, as mentioned in the Introduction, pay careful 
attention to the infant’s relationship with his or her primary caregiver. Both theorists refer to this 
caregiver as the mother, and to the part-object relationship of early infancy as being with the 
breast (Klein believed that the breast is known phylogenetically even by babies who are bottle-
fed). That this does not accurately represent all caregivers of infants is obvious; such a discussion 
and its potential modifications for her theory, however, is beyond the scope of this study. 
Additionally, both Klein and Bion use the words “analyst” and “patient” in their writing; both 
were trained as psychoanalysts (Bion was also a psychiatrist, and Klein was a “lay analyst”). For 
the sake of simplicity, I use their terminology in this thesis. The theories certainly apply to and 
are used by a wide range of mental health professionals, including many clinical social workers.  
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Plan of analysis 
 Analyzing Klein’s and Bion’s texts will require perseverance and creativity, as both are 
known to be difficult writers for different reasons. Research professors Rafael Engel and Russell 
Schutt (2009), in their description of content analysis, discuss the problem of words and phrases 
that are ambiguous. In psychoanalytic writing, the meanings of words and phrases can be quite 
polyvalent – sometimes intentionally so! Klein and Bion are very different writers, and so I 
discuss my plans for working with each set of texts individually, but I must preface that by 
saying that both Kleinian and Bionian theories do have a logic and form that can be analyzed, 
though they are complex and multi-layered; I do this through close reading of a variety of 
primary texts and well-regarded secondary sources on each writer.  
 Working with Klein presents an opportunity and a challenge. As R.D. Hinshelwood, a 
major Kleinian scholar, writes: 
Kleinian concepts are especially closely linked to the clinical grounding of 
psychoanalysis. To a major extent Kleinian theory is clinical theory; and the theories that 
patients have about their own minds are the basis of Kleinian theories of the mind. This 
emphasis on taking the patient’s subjective experience seriously has often tended to cause 
confusion, specifically because the language of the subject and the language of the 
observer are traditionally separate discourses in ‘scientific’ psychology (1991, p.1).   
Klein herself elaborated the difficulty of the concepts she tackles, writing in 1946 that “(t)he 
description of such primitive processes suffers from a great handicap, for these phantasies arise 
at a time when the infant has not yet begun to think in words” (p. 102). Through a close reading 
Klein’s theory and her cases, and through reading commentary on her work by prominent 
scholars, I develop a deeper sense of the (often nonverbal) processes that she boldly puts into 
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words. I challenge myself to think more clinically and to understand her theory on its own terms, 
rather than trying to make it fit into pre-held psychological notions.  
 Working with Bion challenges the practitioner-reader to think first in models and 
abstractions; and then, perhaps, to fill in Bion’s sparse and cryptic writing with examples and 
detail from one’s own clinical work.  The same R. D. Hinshelwood, in his introduction to 
Bléandonu’s biography of Bion (1994) writes: 
Bion’s writing often intimidates; therefore we have a surprising hesitancy over 
interpreting his views… The many ideas which he deliberately leaves half-formulated… 
would seem to invite being filled up with flesh and blood and passion. And indeed they 
do. It is what Bion intended; he wanted to work his readers so that they produced their 
own responses, their own hard learning, instead of him. But the task that he seems to 
require of his readers is so personal and idiosyncratic that there is a sense of being in the 
closet with him in a private contemplation (p. ix).  
Hinshelwood attributes this quality to Bion’s attempt to create “an extensive psychoanalytic 
epistemology” (1994, p. xi). In a sense, this is Bion the philosopher-clinician. The reader must 
sometimes work to bring the theory together with the practice. At other times, however, Bion 
uses vivid and striking clinical examples; one gets the sense that, paradoxically, the theory is 
built entirely on clinical observation, and at the same time is an abstraction that stands 
completely on its own. Through reading Bion’s writing and his many interpreters, I apply Bion’s 
complex theory to the important subject of envy.  
Comparing Klein and Bion 
 James Grotstein, a Kleinian/Bionian analyst who was analyzed by Bion, considers Bion’s 
work to be made up of “variations, extensions, modifications, and innovations on a theme by 
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Klein” (2009, p. 302). Thus, the Kleinian/Bionian synthesis of these two writers first looks 
closely into Kleinian thought -- its premises and assumptions, its ways of gathering clinical 
evidence, its method of treatment. It then attempts to understand Bion’s complex use of Kleinian 
ideas: how does he use, extend, and revise Klein’s concepts in order to create something both 
Kleinian and also quite new?  
Potential methodological biases 
 I have a great deal of interest in Kleinian and Bionian theory, and have both practiced and 
received treatment informed by such theory. Intimate personal involvement with theory can 
enhance the writer’s ability to convey its complexity; less positively, it has the potential to blind 
the writer to the limitations of the theory. I do my best to explore what is useful in Kleinian and 
Bionian thought without implying that this is the only way to think or practice effective therapy 
with this type of patient.  
Limitations and strengths 
Without a doubt, both theories have their limitations; they are, for example, more focused 
on the psychic than the material, as is appropriate here, given that psychoanalytic envy is not 
about “real” social or material deprivation. Envy based on material deprivation and social 
injustice and its implications is an important topic and the subject for a different study. 
My ability to fully comprehend these theories and their implications for the 
psychoanalytic concept of envy will have limitations as well; I face limited time and limited 
experience with this kind of work.  
This study’s strength is, no doubt, the richness of its theories and their ability to inform 
and enhance clinical social work practice. The work of Klein and Bion has a great deal to offer 
on the difficult and important subject of envy. Social work literature and social work practice 
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will benefit from a deep look into the unconscious roots of envy and its conceptual and clinical 
implications.  
 In the next chapter, I explore the phenomenon of envy through the eyes of many theorists 
in order to set a broader context for understanding the work of Klein and Bion. Using conceptual 
and clinical material, I discuss and describe how individuals and societies experience the 
manifestations of envy in a wide variety of ways that affect social work praxis. 
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CHAPTER III 
The Phenomenon of Envy 
 
“Two men, an envious man and a covetous man, walking in a wood, meet an elf. The elf 
promises to grant a wish on the condition that while the one man makes the wish, the second 
man will receive twice as much. The covetous man thinks he will let the envious man make the 
wish and so receive twice as much. The envious man agrees, thinks carefully and says finally, 
‘Make me blind in one eye’” 
 -- William Langland, from the poem Piers Plowman (c. 1370-90), in Harris, 1997, p. 312 
 
Envy as a deeply disturbing human emotion has long been present in literature and 
religion. Joseph Epstein, author of the New York Public Library Lectures in Humanities book on 
envy, considers it to be the most insidious and endemic of the seven deadly sins – “the one that 
people are least likely to want to own up to, for to do so is to admit that one is probably 
ungenerous, mean, small-hearted” (2003, p. 1). Melanie Klein quotes Chaucer’s The Parson’s 
Tale: “It is certain that envy is the worst sin that is; for all other sins are sins only against one 
virtue, whereas envy is against all virtue and all goodness” (1957, p. 189).  
 Social work, psychology, and psychoanalysis also see envy as a common, painful, and 
often-intractable problem. French psychoanalyst Benedicte Vidaillet describes the way that envy, 
a “socially reprehensible and taboo emotion,” often stays unconscious (2008, p. 267). She makes 
the argument that a psychoanalytic approach is particularly relevant in understanding envy, as 
psychoanalysis, more than other disciplines, is largely concerned with what is unconscious. 
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 What is envy, exactly? The Oxford English Dictionary defines envy as “a feeling of 
discontented or resentful longing aroused by someone else’s possessions, qualities, or luck.” 
Richard Smith, the editor of a large volume on the subject, differentiates further, between 
“benign” and “malignant” envy (2008, p. 4). While benign envy might be about wanting what 
someone else has and trying to get it (with potentially positive outcomes), malignant envy has 
“concrete, unpleasant consequences for work and romance,” leads to an “impaired” self, and is 
“hostile in nature” (Smith, p. 4). Psychologist Marvin Daniels calls this more severe 
manifestation “morbid envy” (1964-1965, p. 47). Jungian psychoanalyst Murray Stein writes 
that, while everyone experiences envy, there are people who are “chronically envious” (1990, p. 
169). The chronically envious are continuously vulnerable to envy reactions, and it becomes 
their “central psychological task” to resolve issues related to envy (Stein, p. 169).  
 For the purposes of this study, I have chosen to focus the morbid, malignant, chronic kind 
of envy, hereafter referred to simply as envy. It is not, as Kleinian psychoanalyst Elizabeth Bott 
Spillius clarifies, the kind of envy that one sees in the “apparently envious and deprived 
individual who ceases to feel envious if the deprivation is removed” (1993, p. 1202). Rather, as 
relational psychoanalyst Adrienne Harris puts it, this kind of envy is “fueled by a passion that 
seems unquenchable until the external world can be seen and experienced as devastated and 
ruined as the internal world” (1997, p. 312). In this chapter, I will detail some of the specific 
ways that envy causes painful and sometimes seemingly intractable problems in people’s lives, 
intrapsychically, interpersonally, and societally. Clinicians have written most of the literature 
cited in this chapter; thus, much of what follows are the manifestations of envy that cause people 
to enter into treatment.  
 
 17 
Difficulties in connecting 
 Envy hurts interpersonal relationships in a variety of ways. Argentine psychoanalysts 
Horacio Etchegoyen and Clara Nemas describe how envy interferes with the ability to express 
and have dependency needs met (2003, p. 55), crucial in intimate relationships. Daniels shows 
how, for the chronically envious, value becomes “ephemeral;” obtaining what is envied leads 
quickly to a lack of interest in what seemed to be desired, and the envier holds the envied party 
responsible for the “dysphoric emotions” that follow (1964-1965 p. 49); one can imagine how 
this manifests in relationships. Kleinian psychoanalyst Betty Joseph gives a clear example in 
what she calls “the deadening of conversations” (1986, p. 15). She notes that the envious person 
“can hardly bear” to listen to another person’s entertaining thoughts or experiences and will find 
all sorts of ways of cutting off, taking over, or “paralyzing” the conversation (Joseph, p. 15). The 
only way for the deeply envious person to self-soothe is to find a way of making the other 
unenviable – in possession of nothing good – an obvious block to reciprocal relationships. 
British psychoanalyst Kate Barrows describes in envious people “a pattern of unsatisfactory 
relationships in which the individual cannot take things in from other people” (2002, p. 21) and a 
great difficulty in trusting others (p. 27). Psychologist Christopher Bonovitz, drawing on the 
work of Wilfred Bion, proposes that what makes envy harmful is the “breakdown in 
intersubjectivity” – a block in the “the ability to ‘know’ the other’s mind” (2010, p. 427). As will 
be evident, problems in connecting will be a theme that is elaborated in many of the following 
manifestations of envy.  
Pathological projective processes 
 Another way that envy interferes with interpersonal relationships is through projection 
and projective identification. English psychotherapist Joseph Berke, who has written extensively 
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on the subject of envy, describes the process of projection in significant envy as “designed to 
evacuate envious anguish and anger elsewhere” (1985, p. 176). A patient might, for example,  
project envy into others and not (consciously) feel herself to be envious; rather, she would feel 
herself to be surrounded by people who are envious of her youth and talents (Joseph, 1986, p. 20-
21). Harris describes the way in which “disowned and destructive self states are created as a 
persecutory other” (1997, p. 299). In this way, the envier and the envied are caught in “a lethal 
dance of mutual terrorization” that greatly impedes any ability to connect (Harris, p. 299). Berke 
notes, to take it a step further, that in projective identification the envier is not satisfied with 
“simply evacuating the contents of his mind” (p. 176). Rather, “simultaneously and vengefully 
he seeks to totally alter and rubbish the object, to destroy any goodness in it and to control it so it 
can’t fight back” (Berke, p. 176).  
 It is important to remember, as the clinician seeks to understand the experience of an 
individual in relationships, what psychoanalysts Horacio Etchegoyen, Rafael Lopez, and Moses 
Rabih remind us: that a “defect in the integration of envy” makes a person particularly 
vulnerable to the envy of others, and that no matter how much a person may project envy, “one 
cannot dismiss the presence of envy in the rest” (1987, p. 53). In other words, the clinician must 
use caution when “diagnosing” projective processes.  
Narcissism 
 Many theorists have considered the connections between envy and narcissism. Joseph 
Berke, for example, considers them to be variations of the same problem: “excessive mental 
pain, consciously perceived as overweening inferiority and inadequacy” (1985, p. 180). The 
envier deflates others and the narcissist inflates him or herself, but the “thinking, feelings and 
actions run along convergent tracks” (Berke, p. 180). Etchegoyen and his colleagues note that, 
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theoretically, “when one speaks of narcissism one thinks of the structure and when one speaks of 
envy one considers the drive as the point of reference” (1987, p. 51). Thus, a narcissistic 
structure might cause a person to feel unable to be filled and thus constantly needing more from 
others than is possible to get, while envy adds a destructiveness that is more “driven.” Spillius 
finds that the grievance present in the experience of envy can be seen as a narcissistic defense, in 
the sense that “feeling perpetual grievance and blame, however miserable, is less painful than 
mourning the loss of the relationships one wishes one had” (1993, p. 1204). When both are 
present in parents during divorce, for example, the results can be devastating: “pathological 
narcissism, pathological envy, disavowal, and a perverse attitude toward reality can produce 
unending conflicts over visitation and custody” as “fighting over seemingly insignificant matters 
can manage aggression and ward off psychic collapse” (Donner, 2006, p. 542). Psychotherapists 
Diane and Michael Hailparn (2000) discuss a similar process in envious parents sabotaging their 
children’s therapy, either by finding a reason to terminate the therapy or, because of the threat 
posed by the child’s relationship with the therapist, encouraging the child to devalue the therapist 
and the therapeutic relationship.  
Paranoia and the fear of success 
 Envy is also present in states of paranoia and may reflect a fear of success. For example, 
as Bonovitz notes, “envy promotes a nagging sense that injustice and unfairness pervade the 
world” (2010, p. 426). As Joseph describes, the person who is:  
Very envious and spoiling in his relationships, even in a hidden way, including hidden to 
himself, will experience his world as hostile or spoiling towards him and become more 
paranoid or suspicious in his attitude to people, so that his world becomes unpleasant to 
him and he becomes more and more on the defensive and less able to enjoy. (1986, p. 18) 
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Because some forms of envy include both exciting and “deeply destructive wishes,” (think of a 
delight in gossip), the excitement that can accompany those wishes may produce less conscious 
guilt but more “paranoia and persecutory fears” (Harris, 1997, p. 299). Again, the destructiveness 
that comes from within is feared (or found) to be present outside the self.  
 One effect of this process can be a fear of success and experiences of self-sabotage that 
may bring people into treatment. Psychoanalyst Susan Kavaler-Adler, for example, writes about 
how “split-off envy and split-off self-sabotage” must become “consciously owned through the 
grieving of existential guilt” in order to alleviate intense fears of success (2006, p. 117). 
Adrienne Harris discusses the role of envying and being envied in women’s struggles with regard 
to ambition and achievement (1997, p. 298). As she describes, the “disabling structures of 
envy… corrode and damage self-structures and self-actualization” for many women (Harris, p. 
303).   
Blocks to admiration and gratitude 
 Envy is associated with a lack of the development of important emotions such as 
admiration and gratitude. Swedish psychologist Rolf Sandell thinks of envy and admiration as 
contrary ways of coping with relative deprivation (having less of something good than another 
person has) and associates envy with Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position and admiration with the 
depressive position (1993). Envy comes with a sense of hopelessness, phantasies of persecution, 
and object-splitting, while hope, sympathy, and compartmentalization of particular traits are 
associated with admiration (Sandell). Etchegoyen and his colleagues see envy and admiration as 
on a continuum that “allows us to establish hierarchies of what is good and bad, which brings us 
to the plane of values” (1987, p. 52). Envy is then associated with a problematic set of ethics. 
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Lack of capacity for admiration is harmful to relationships as well as to the capacity to have role 
models and mentors in one’s professional or creative process.  
 Joseph describes the way in which the envious person “cannot bear that something good 
is given to him by another person” (1986, p. 15). She describes a patient who, faced with the 
problem of “experiencing and expressing gratitude” simply “cannot get it out—it sticks in his 
throat” (Joseph, p. 15). This block with regard to gratitude is explored further in Chapter Four.    
Appreciation, giving, and receiving 
 While envy impedes on the ability to admire, it also hurts more egalitarian, peer 
relationships. Etchegoyen and Nemas describe appreciation as “the capacity of the subject to 
perceive the merits of the object, without necessarily idealizing it” (2003, p. 53); envy is a 
serious block to such a capacity. As Spillius describes, there are conscious and unconscious 
feelings involved in giving and receiving; she believes that “it is in this relation and its 
internalization that envy is particularly likely to be aroused, diminished, exacerbated, or 
perpetuated” (1993, p. 1211). Until envy is “worked through” (to be discussed in later chapters), 
giving and receiving are likely to exacerbate envy, hurting mutual relationships. To note a few 
examples, psychologist Celia Fisher (1989) writes about envy as causing problems in 
connections between peers later in life, Harris (1997) about the “corrosive” and often disavowed 
envy in friendships and collegial relationships (p. 313), social worker Karin Schultz (1991) about 
the effects of the fear of envy on women’s friendships, and occupational therapist Sharan 
Schwartzberg (2007) about envy and competition in the workplace. 
Concretization 
According to psychiatrist Maxine Anderson, a “de-animating process” can happen in 
envy; this is a dynamic in which psychic reality becomes material reality – thus the term 
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“concretization” (2011, p. 126). She argues that while experiences like fatigue, chagrin, and 
doubt always tug at one’s ability to remain open-minded, more “primitive” emotions like envy 
may cause a more “violent” de-animation and concretization (Anderson, p. 126). In that process, 
“the space for reflective thought collapses” and “one can no longer think about a situation but 
instead experiences being trapped in or defined by that situation” (Anderson, p. 127). The 
presence of concretization in envy helps to explain why it can be felt to be such an intractable 
problem for both individuals and clinicians. Problems can seem to be too completely “real” for 
change to matter or be possible.  
Perversion of desire and the inability to enjoy 
 Malignant envy is considered by some to be a kind of perverted desire (Bonovitz, 2010). 
For example, Bonovitz describes the feeling of being not only “cheated or deprived” of what is 
wanted, but more importantly, deprived of “something that is fulfilling and intrinsically 
meaningful” (p. 432). Others are content with what they have – are somehow complete – while 
the envious person feels that he or she can never be satisfied and that his or her desires are too 
much for any other person to reasonably handle. Joseph adds that when envious people have 
good or pleasurable experiences, “there is the nagging feeling that they could get more, or 
someone else had it better, or there is something wrong with it, or, if they get it know, why 
couldn’t they have had it before; it would have been so much better when they were younger” 
(1986, p. 18). Etchegoyen and Nemas agree: “nothing interferes with enjoyment more than envy” 
(2003, p. 54).  
Learning difficulties and confusion 
 The same envy that leads to the “deadening of conversation” and problems in 
interpersonal relationships can also cause problems in learning (Joseph, 1986, p. 15). Someone 
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with malignant envy “may find it so hard to tolerate that another person has something to give 
him that he cannot recognize or use the other person constructively” – the problem may “prevent 
the individual from reading and using books, scientific papers, etc., because the feeling is of 
having to know what is written before he reads it, and, therefore, his mind is not free to follow 
the argument of the book or paper” (Joseph, p. 15). Such envy can prevent people from “using or 
believing in” professional advice and help (Joseph, p. 15), an added difficulty in the treatment of 
people with severe envy. Daniels (1964-1965) describes the ways in which envy can affect 
learning in schoolchildren who show aptitude but not consistency in their schoolwork. Harris 
adds that envy acts as an intrapsychic and interpersonal “brake on growth, change, acquisition, 
and mastery” (1997, p. 313). Envious attacks on good objects, according to Spillius, are likely to 
lead to confusion about the object’s goodness or badness, which “impairs processes of 
differentiation and the development of rational thought” (1993, p. 1200). The confusion 
produced by envy is a “paradoxical, radical confusion, since the good is bad because it produces 
envy and the bad is good because it does not” (Etchegoyen et al., 1987, p. 52).  
Shame and guilt 
 Shame, guilt, and envy are often conceptualized together, as part and parcel of a dynamic 
“package.” Shame and envy are not the same, however, as Berke (1986) points out. He describes 
the differences this way: “Shame arises from a sudden unwelcome awareness about oneself, 
while envy is provoked by the painful perception of discrepancies between oneself and another” 
(p. 262). Envy, because it is “the most destructive to integrity and property” is “the most 
shameful experience and the one most defended against” (Berke, p. 264) – as many have noted, 
people do not want to know their own envy. Being envious can, in fact, feel like its own 
“narcissistic injury, pointing as is does to absences and limits in the self in comparison to the 
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envied other” (Harris, 1997, p. 299). For example, Spillius describes how attacks on goodness in 
envy lead to the “premature development of guilt before the individual is able to stand the pain 
of it” (1993, p. 1200). Thus, shame and guilt, as they relate to envy, are often quite painful and 
often bring people into contact with clinicians.  
Frustration 
 Frustration and envy seem to be linked as well. For example, Etchegoyen et al. describe 
their interplay as “frustration provokes envy and envy incites frustration” (1987, p. 50). 
Etchegoyen and his colleagues also note an interesting way in which frustration manifests within 
interpersonal relationships in people with significant envy: “Finding the object becomes a 
fundamentally frustrating experience only if the subject wants to be the object instead of to have 
it” (p. 54). The frustration that continues to be present even after one has “gotten” the desired 
object is one of the reasons that the problem of envy can be so painful in relationships.  
Self esteem, worthlessness, and lack 
Theorists have often noted the relationship between envy and a feeling of lack in oneself. 
Daniels, for example, sees problems in self-esteem as a primary factor in causing envy (1964-
1965). As he puts it, “A crippling belief in one’s relative inferiority is at the core of the self-
system; and therefore nothing can satisfy the morbidly envious person” (Daniels, p. 48). Jungian 
psychoanalyst Warren Colman believes that envy always results in a loss of self-esteem: since it 
inherently involves comparing oneself to another, it is “bound up with a lack of differentiation” 
and a lack of “the capacity to value one’s own uniqueness as a separate person, different from, 
albeit intimately connected with, others” (1991, p. 356).  
 Stein describes the way that envy destroys the inner world by forcing “self-energies and 
self-objects” outside, where they are “withdrawn and withholding” (1990, p. 162). It is fueled by 
 25 
“an unconscious over-investment of value in others and by a consequent lack of investment 
within” (Stein, p. 162). Envy can cause other people to seem to be filled with “goodness or with 
resources” while the self is deprived, empty, “powerless, anxious, and rageful” (Harris, 1997, p. 
312). It is a “tragic outcome,” writes Stein, “when these persons end up feeling evil, which can 
and does happen” (p. 170). 
Defenses against envy 
 Sometimes, what brings people who struggle with envy into contact with clinicians are 
the defenses that are used to try to ward it off. Since people tend to envy those who are closer in 
status to them (where a comparison seems more possible), people often idealize the other or 
devalue the self in order to make the gap between the two larger so that the envied person stays 
“out of range” (Joseph, 1986, p. 18). Spillius describes other defenses against envy, including 
devaluing the good object, projecting or identifying with projected envy (noted earlier in this 
chapter), emotional withdrawal, and masochism (in which the envied object “cannot cure the 
individual’s despair” and is thus “proved to be worthless” (1993, p. 1204). Joseph also notes the 
limiting of experiences in an attempt to avoid feeling envy – she describes a man who stays in 
the house and never socializes except with his wife, for whom he feels contempt – he thus avoids 
having his envy stimulated but his range of life experiences is greatly diminished (p. 21). 
Intersections between envy and other dynamics: gender and racism 
 Many writers note the intersections of envy and gender issues. For example, psychologist 
Carolyn Ellman believes that understanding one’s own envy and one’s fear of other women’s 
envy is crucial to women’s development (2000, p. 633). She notes that women’s guilt with 
regard to envious feelings “often leads to profound inhibitions and masochistic behavior” 
(Ellman, p. 633). Harris argues that many mothers are “so defensively worried about their own 
 26 
hatreds and envies” that they often “have difficulty providing the necessary containment of a 
daughter’s hatred and aggression” (1997, p. 297).  
 Men also experience particular kinds of envy that relate to gender. Social worker Judith 
Einzig (1980) discusses the issue of womb envy in expectant fathers. Psychoanalyst Richard 
Reichbart describes adult male patients with an “internal prohibition against crying, learned 
individually and often culturally encouraged” (2006, p. 1067). Such a prohibition makes it more 
difficult for men to process loss, be intimate with others, and accept vulnerability. As Reichbart 
argues, “the prohibition against men crying may be a consequence of male envy of maternal 
traits and other feminine characteristics” (p. 1067).  
 Envy and racism are also importantly intersected. For example, envy can cause people 
“to perceive others as possessing something good that has been stolen from us; jobs, cultures, 
ways of life” (Clarke, 2003, p. 42). Simon Clarke, a professor of sociology, writes that “The 
racist, unable to enjoy cultural difference, is a manifestation of envy, making bad what is good 
and destroying what he cannot have because he is unable to accept and share” (p. 42). Social 
workers Brian Rasmussen and Daniel Salhani add that, in envy, “One must always be fearful of 
others who do not have because they pose a continuous threat” (2010, p. 504). The fear and 
destructiveness that comes from envy has substantial effects on the ways people treat each other 
interpersonally and politically.  
Chapter summary 
 In this review of the literature on psychoanalytic envy, I noted the many ways that envy 
can lead to intrapsychic, interpersonal, and societal problems. Envy’s effects can be powerful, 
and difficult to recognize and treat therapeutically. The writers cited in this chapter have 
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connected with envy with a variety of causes, linked it to other mental/emotional/experiential 
phenomena, and considered how it might be treated.  
 In the next chapters, I explore in depth the theories of Melanie Klein and Wilfred Bion. 
Their nuanced and original conceptualizations of the phenomenon of envy as well as 
prescriptions for its effective treatment will deepen our understanding of what envy is and how it 
can be addressed in the clinical situation.  
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CHAPTER IV 
Kleinian Envy 
 
Melanie Klein (1882-1960) is widely recognized to be one of the most influential 
thinkers and writers in the field of psychoanalysis. Relational analysts Stephen Mitchell and 
Margaret Black, in their history of psychoanalytic thought, consider her to have had “more 
impact on contemporary psychoanalysis than any other psychoanalytic writer since Freud” 
(1995, p. 85). Psychiatrist Thomas Ogden, known for his close readings of major psychoanalytic 
writers, believes that much of the development of object relations theory has been made up of 
Klein’s ideas and reactions against them (1984). Psychotherapist Jean White, author of a book on 
contemporary psychoanalysis, notes that Melanie Klein’s investigation of pre-Oedipal and pre-
verbal states of mind made psychoanalytic work with psychotic patients possible (2006).   
 Kleinian psychoanalyst Roger Money-Kyrle, in his introduction to Klein’s collected 
works, describes how Klein “had come across a book by Freud and felt that she recognized in it 
something she had always vaguely been looking for” (p. ix).  A divorced mother of three, she 
went into analysis with Sandor Ferenczi in Budapest, then Karl Abraham in Berlin, and finally 
Ernest Jones in England, where she lived until her death in 1960. Klein’s analysts were close 
colleagues and friends of Sigmund Freud, and Klein consistently stated that her intent was to 
“validate and extend Freud’s hypotheses through direct observation and clinical work with 
children” (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 85). Yet, the discoveries she made in her work with 
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children - and later with adults - led her to a picture of mental development and therapeutic 
technique that was in many ways radically different than Freud’s. Those differences led to a 
tension with Anna Freud that culminated in a split in the British psychoanalytic society between 
the Kleinians, the (Anna) Freudians, and later, the Independents (based on the work of W.R.D. 
Fairbairn and D.W. Winnicott). The split within the British society affected psychoanalytic 
schools internationally, including in the United States, where Kleinian thought has tended to be 
isolated from other psychoanalytic trends, though this has been changing since the end of the 
dominance of ego psychology in the 1980s.   
 Klein began to develop her theories for and through her work with both very disturbed 
and fairly healthy children. Her belief that psychoanalysis could be used prophylactically to 
decrease intellectual inhibition and increase the ability for sublimation and good object relations, 
along with her groundbreaking confidence that psychoanalysis could be used to treat people with 
schizophrenia, paranoia, and manic-depressive conditions, meant that Klein developed her theory 
and technique for an incredibly wide range of patients.  
 While Freud saw the psyche as “shaped through the Oedipal conflict into stable and 
coherent structures, with hidden recesses and illicit designs,” Klein’s vision of the mind was “a 
continually shifting, kaleidoscopic stream of primitive, phantasmagoric images, fantasies, and 
terrors” (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 87). Kleinian psychoanalyst Juliet Mitchell describes 
Klein’s “descriptive unconscious” as “an area where present and past are one and time is spatial, 
not historical,” where the unconscious has not been constructed by repression (1986, p. 28). 
Kleinian scholar Robert Hinshelwood describes Klein’s concepts as being “about very primitive 
elements of the human mind, remote from common sense” (1991, p. 1). The reader will note 
throughout this chapter Klein’s uniqueness, her commitment to understanding deep and complex 
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psychological and developmental phenomena, and her theoretical and clinical originality and 
creativity. 
In this chapter, I introduce the reader to the Kleinian concepts that set the stage for 
Klein’s last major theoretical innovation, her work on envy. I explore Klein’s model of mental 
development, some of her overarching theoretical and technical concerns, and her innovations in 
technique, before discussing her conceptualization of envy and its treatment. Beginning with her 
unique picture of infant mental life, I discuss the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions and 
the object relations, anxieties and defenses they consist of. Using Klein’s idea of the infant in the 
child or adult personality, I examine how infantile and childhood experiences continue to affect 
the personality later in life. Next, I look at some of Klein’s major theoretical concerns: her 
concepts of phantasy and internal objects, the life and death drives, and her revisions of Freud’s 
super-ego and Oedipus complex. I cover Klein’s play technique for children, her 
conceptualization of transference, and her measure of a successful psychoanalytic treatment. 
Then I explore the concept of evidence in Kleinian theory: upon what is her theory built? And 
finally, I explore Klein’s important and new conceptualization of envy. I consider envy’s role in 
Klein’s view of mental development and discuss how she believes that psychoanalysis can come 
to treat it effectively.  
Model of mental development 
 Much of Klein’s work was centered on questions of the infantile experience and how it 
carries into and affects childhood and adulthood. In a sense, Klein seemed to be asking: why are 
people so aggressive and sadistic? (Later in her career she became more interested in love, but a 
great deal of her work is more focused on destructiveness and its corollaries.) Klein’s model of 
mental development, particularly her concept of the two infantile positions and how they carry 
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into adult life, provided something of an answer to her original question. Later in this chapter, I 
show how her understanding of envy enhanced her understanding of mental development and 
provided a more complete answer to her inquiry into human destructiveness.  
The paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions 
 
Klein conceived of these two “positions” in a person’s development as sets of 
experiences that include particular kinds of object relations, anxieties, and defenses. These are 
phases that occur at a certain time in an infant’s life as well as places to which an individual may 
return in other moments. Juliet Mitchell calls this concept “a mental space in which one is 
sometimes lodged” (1986, p. 28). 
Klein theorized that the infant spends the first three months of life in the paranoid-
schizoid position. During this time, he or she relates not to whole people, but to part-objects, the 
most important of which is the mother’s breast. In the paranoid-schizoid position, the experience 
of persecutory anxiety is overwhelming. Klein believed that “anxiety arises from the operation of 
the death instinct within the organism, is felt as fear of annihilation (death) and takes the form of 
fear of persecution” (1946, p. 4). Coinciding with the operation of the death instinct, bodily 
frustrations are felt to be caused by objects that become persecutory as a result of the infant’s 
projections of his aggressive and destructive impulses. Splitting, the separation of good and bad 
(gratifying and frustrating) aspects of the same object into putatively different objects, and 
projective identification, the infant’s projection of his or her own feelings into the object, are 
used to manage the terror and aggression of the utterly dependent infant. Splitting thus functions 
to protect the “good breast,” which is felt to provide nourishment and comfort, so that good 
experiences can be internalized. If there are not enough experiences of the good breast, or if the 
infant is excessively envious (I come back to this later in this chapter) and cannot take in its good 
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objects, then the good breast is idealized but not assimilated, and excessive splitting and 
projective identification impoverish the ego. Given that psychosis in adults tends to manifest in 
splitting, impoverishment of the ego, and annihilation anxiety, Klein saw the anxieties and 
defenses of the paranoid-schizoid position as having a great deal in common with the experience 
of psychosis in adults.  
 In the second quarter of the first year, Klein believed that the infant enters into what she 
called the depressive position. In the depressive position, relationships are with whole objects 
rather than part-objects. The result is that “the loved and hated aspects of the mother are no 
longer felt to be so widely separated,” which leads to “an increased fear of loss, states akin to 
mourning, and a strong feeling of guilt because the aggressive impulses are felt to be directed 
against the loved object” (Klein, 1946, p. 14). This is a time of greater integration of the ego, an 
increased understanding of psychic reality and the external world, and a drive to make reparation 
for aggressive feelings. The infant still injures the loved object in phantasy but also feels guilt 
and seeks to protect it and repair it from its own aggressive impulses. There is an understanding 
of the caregiver as a whole person and a fear of loss of love or loss of the loved object. Klein 
connected the depressive position to later states of depression and loss. “Just as the young child 
passing through the depressive position is struggling, in his unconscious mind, with the task of 
establishing and integrating his inner world, so the mourner goes through the pain of re-
establishing and reintegrating it” (1940, p. 354). One of the reasons envy is so harmful and 
problematic is its interference with the ability to tolerate depressive anxieties and mourning 
processes.   
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The infant in the child and adult  
 A hallmark of Kleinian psychoanalysis is its vision of the infant (the infantile experience) 
in the child and adult. Klein saw infantile conflicts repeating in childhood and adult life, to 
varying degrees, depending on a person’s “constitution” and experience. Depressive anxiety (the 
fear of loss of love/loss of the loved object that is experienced for the first time in the second 
quarter of the first year) never goes away, but the healthy child or adult tolerates it. Object 
relations in healthy adulthood are to whole objects; the good and bad can be held together 
without the use of massive splitting or manic defenses such as denial of psychic or external 
reality. These are paranoid-schizoid mechanisms, used later in life by the ill child or adult as an 
attempt to avoid depressive anxiety. The healthy child or adult still has aggressive feelings but 
has worked through the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions well enough that such 
feelings become bound by the internalization of good objects so that they do not require 
management by primitive defenses. Sublimation and curiosity become possible due to a lack of 
persecutory anxiety; in other words, the healthy adult is able to learn and work without feeling 
attacked by bad internal and external objects.  
Describing the struggle that the infant goes through (in phantasy) of destruction and 
repair of the loved object (and fear that the loved object has in fact been destroyed), Klein wrote, 
“In my view, these basic conflicts profoundly influence the course and force of the emotional 
lives of grown-up individuals” (1937, p. 309). She also agreed with Freud about the fluidity of 
health and pathology: “the difference between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ is one of quantity and 
not of structure, an empirical finding constantly confirmed in our work” (1922, p. 55). Thus, 
infantile conflicts are part of every child and adult, though to different degrees and handled in 
different ways. Envy’s interference with tolerating aggressive feelings, depressive anxieties, and 
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ongoing relationships with imperfect objects is harmful in infancy and carries through childhood 
and adult experience.  
Major theoretical concerns 
 During Klein’s long and fruitful career, her work spanned many areas of theory and made 
significant contributions on a wide range of topics. In this section, I present the theoretical 
constructs and revisions that are most important to understanding Klein’s conceptualization of 
envy and its treatment. Klein’s original concept of phantasy, her work on internal objects, and 
her revised understanding of the life and death drives, the super-ego, and the Oedipus complex 
lay the groundwork for understanding where envy emerges and why, how it manifests, and how 
it functions in psychoanalytically informed treatment.  
Phantasy 
 Klein’s concept of unconscious phantasy (spelled with a ph to differentiate it from 
conscious fantasy) is critical to her theoretical and clinical work. She believed that the infant 
begins to build phantasies almost from birth (Klein, 1936, 1937). “For instance, the baby who 
feels a craving for his mother’s breast when it is not there may imagine it to be there, i.e. he may 
imagine the satisfaction which he derives from it” (1937, p. 308). Klein believed that the child 
responds to every kind of stimulus with some kind of phantasy: to unpleasant stimuli, including 
frustration, with aggressive phantasies, and to gratifying stimuli with pleasurable phantasies. 
Controversially, Klein interpreted the content of the phantasies of infants: she believed that they 
imagine tearing the breast to bits, for example, and then putting it back together. Susan Isaacs, a 
collaborator of Klein’s, elaborates: 
It has sometimes been suggested that unconscious phantasies such as that of ‘tearing to 
bits’ would not arise in the child's mind before he had gained the conscious 
 35 
knowledge that tearing a person to bits would mean killing them. Such a view does not 
meet the case. It overlooks the fact that such knowledge is inherent in bodily impulses as 
a vehicle of instinct, in the excitation of the organ, i.e. in this case, the mouth (1948, p. 
86).  
The full debate is beyond the scope of this study; what is most important is Klein’s focus on 
trying to understand the “nature and contents” of early anxieties and the “continuous interplay” 
between actual experiences and phantasy-life” (1935, p. 285). Later in this chapter, I explore 
Klein’s process of trying to understand such content, the kind of evidence she used, and the 
limitations she faced. When Klein later began to explore infantile and adult envy, it became one 
of the most important contents of unconscious phantasy.  
Internal objects 
 A great deal of the work done in phantasy during the paranoid-schizoid and depressive 
positions centers on the ego’s assimilation of objects, good and bad, into its inner world. Klein 
imagined an internal landscape full of objects that relate to each other and the outside world. She 
considered the possession of such objects to be deeply unconscious. Regarding the internalized 
good parents, Klein wrote, 
They are not felt consciously to be there, but rather as something within the personality 
having the nature of kindness and wisdom; this leads to confidence and trust in oneself 
and helps to combat and overcome the feelings of fear of having bad figures within one 
and of being governed by one’s own uncontrollable hatred; and furthermore, this leads to 
trust in people in the outside world beyond the family circle (1936, p. 295).  
From this perspective, envy’s interference with the necessary internalization of good objects 
explains a great deal about why it is so dangerous to the subject who experiences it.   
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Life and death drives  
 Klein took Freud’s concept of the two instincts and made it central to her theory of 
human life and also of envy. Thomas Ogden describes the Kleinian conception of the life and 
death instincts as follows: “The psychological correlates of the life instinct include the loving, 
sexual, nurturing, attachment-seeking, and generative motivations, while the psychological 
correlates of the death instinct include destructive, disintegrative, envious, and hostile 
motivations” (1984, p. 525). Here we see envy’s link with the Kleinian death drive; it is part of 
all that works against love and creativity.   
Klein believed that in play therapy with children, she could see her patients’ aggressive 
tendencies and phantasies giving rise to great anxiety, which the ego attempts to hold back or 
calm down with the help of its libidinal impulses (1933). Klein described how she saw the 
instincts together clinically and the necessity of analyzing and thus reducing the power of the 
death instinct:  
This picture exemplifies Freud’s thesis of the life-instinct (eros) at war with the death-
instinct, or instinct of aggression. But we also recognize that there is the closest union 
and interaction between these two forces at every point, so that analysis can only succeed 
in tracing the child’s aggressive phantasies in all their details, and thus diminishing their 
effect in so far as it can follow up the libidinal ones and uncover their earliest sources as 
well – and vice versa (1933, p. 252-3). 
Klein also noted that while aggressive feelings lead to great disturbances in mental life, they are 
also of high value for development through sublimation and the challenge they provide to grow 
(1936). She also believed in the power of analysis to influence the destructiveness of aggression 
in humans:  
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It [psychoanalysis] cannot, it is true, altogether do away with man’s aggressive instinct as 
such; but it can, by diminishing the anxiety which accentuates those instincts, break up 
the mutual reinforcement that is going on all the time between his hatred and his fear 
(1933, p. 257).  
Later in this chapter I elaborate on Klein’s thinking about therapeutic change as it relates to envy 
and the death instinct in the section on envy in Kleinian theory (treatment).  
Super-ego 
 The Kleinian super-ego differs from the classical Freudian super-ego in three important 
ways. First, based on clinical observation, Klein placed the beginning of the super-ego much 
earlier than Freud, in the first or second year of life rather than the fourth or fifth; second, she 
saw the super-ego as made up of multiple and varied parts, not simply the introjected parents; 
and third, she noted a longer developmental course, through which the super-ego (ideally) 
softens in its harshness and there is an integration of its many (and contradictory) parts 
(Hinshelwood, 1991). Klein saw very young children with terrifyingly harsh and cruel super-
egos and tremendous guilt. She believed that analyzing the early stages of the super-ego’s 
formation could promote the development of the ego by “lessening the sadism of the super-ego 
and the id” (1931, p. 243). Agreeing with Freud that the criminal’s super-ego is in fact harsher 
and more primitive than the non-criminal’s, she reflected: 
I have never finished an analysis with the feeling that this faculty has become too much 
weakened; on the other hand there have been a good many at the conclusion of which I 
have wished that its exaggerated power could be still further reduced (1927a, p. 164).  
In short, envy dangerously influences the development of the super-ego. Psychoanalyst James 
Grotstein writes about the way “the envious infant becomes shamefully ridiculed by an internal 
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superego object” (2009, p. 252). The harshness of a primitive superego makes things yet more 
difficult for the already pained, envious infant (or infant in the child or adult).  
Oedipus complex 
 Klein’s major revision to the Freudian Oedipus complex was again her dating of the 
process as much earlier: she saw Oedipal tendencies beginning as a consequence of the 
frustration the child experiences upon weaning, and continuing through the frustrations of 
training in cleanliness in the second year of life (1928). The consequence of such feelings 
coming on so early is an interesting one: 
We find that important consequences ensue from the fact that the ego is still so little 
developed when it is assailed by the onset of the Oedipus tendencies and the incipient 
sexual curiosity associated with them. The infant, still undeveloped intellectually, is 
exposed to an onrush of problems and questions. One of the most bitter grievances which 
we come upon in the unconscious is that these many overwhelming questions, which are 
apparently only partly conscious and even when conscious cannot yet be expressed in 
words, remain unanswered (1928, p. 188).  
Klein saw this grievance as being at the root of inhibitions of the epistemophilic impulse, and 
believed that the curiosity of children, often around age four or five, is “not the beginning, but 
the climax and termination” of the Oedipal phase of development (1929, p. 188).   
 Klein also added to the theory of the Oedipus complex by linking it with intricate and 
interdependent aspects of development and object relations. She saw anxiety, guilt, and 
depressive feelings as “intrinsic elements of the child’s emotional life” which permeate relations 
to real people as well as their representatives in the inner world (1945, p. 419). Envy was later 
understood to make the Oedipal process much more difficult: envy sabotages the desire to learn, 
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creates premature guilt and excessive shame, and makes it more difficult to tolerate object 
relations with whole people.   
Innovations in technique 
 Klein’s work on technique comprises some of her most important contributions to 
psychoanalysis. In this section, I explicate Klein’s play technique, where she discovered and re-
worked her theoretical constructs, including envy, and her technique with adult patients, where 
she transformed the use of transference and the idea of a successful treatment and experimented 
with how envy can be treated.   
Play technique for children 
 Klein’s development of her play technique for children was based on the idea that “The 
important causes of injury to the impulse for knowledge and to the reality-sense, repudiation and 
denial of the sexual and primitive, set repression in operation by dissociation” (1921, p. 21). She 
felt that by sparing the child unnecessary repression, one could open up far more growth and 
creativity than would otherwise develop. Her method was to interpret children’s play, like 
dreams, “via their use of symbols that are particular to each child” (1955, p. 137). Klein believed 
that children would bring the analyst their phantasies if the analyst observed and played with the 
child with the conviction that the play is symbolic (1927a). She found that she was able to see 
the alleviation of anxiety in children when their sadistic phantasies and impulses were interpreted 
(1948). Klein was optimistic about work with children; she believed that significant change 
could happen, even with emotionally disturbed children who seemed not to “connect” to others: 
“I do not believe in the existence of a child in whom it is impossible to obtain this transference, 
or in whom the capacity for love cannot be brought out” (1927b, p. 184, italics in original). 
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Klein’s dedication to working with even children who others deemed “unanalyzable” helped her 
to clinically observe envy in young children and later adults.   
Transference 
 Klein’s vision of transference was closely connected with her ideas about infancy, the 
infant in the child and adult mind, and the life and death drives. 
I hold that transference originates in the same processes which in the earliest stages 
determine object-relations. Therefore we have to go back again and again in analysis to 
the fluctuations between objects, loved and hated, external and internal, which dominate 
early infancy. We can fully appreciate the interconnection between positive and negative 
transferences only if we explore the early interplay between love and hate, and the 
vicious circle of aggression, anxieties, feelings of guilt and increased aggression, as well 
as the various aspects of objects towards whom these conflicting emotions and anxieties 
are directed (Klein, 1952a, p. 53).  
She emphasized, in particular, the analysis of the negative transference, which she felt had been 
neglected. If the analyst tried to reinforce the positive transference only and become introjected 
as a good object, Klein believed that while a belief in good objects could then be strengthened, 
the gain would not be stable, as the patient would not have been able to work through her hatred, 
anxiety, and suspicion (1952b). Only through deep analysis of the positive and negative 
transference, Klein felt, could anxiety and the repetition compulsion be curbed and true 
psychological growth possible. It would seem that her ability to consistently analyze 
transference, particularly negative transference, helped her to conceptualize envy and, as I show 
in the section on the treatment of envy, relentlessly work to lessen its hold on her patients.   
 
 41 
Measure of a successful treatment 
 Klein’s measure of a successful treatment went beyond the development of stability or an 
increase in the sense of reality. She considered a “wealth of phantasy life and the capacity for 
experiencing emotions freely” to be necessary for a “deep and full personality” – this she saw as 
the real goal of psychoanalytic treatment (1950, p. 46). Thus in the treatment, the depressive 
position must be worked through: “the whole gamut of love and hatred, anxiety, grief and guilt in 
relation to the primary objects” must be experienced again and again (1950, p. 46) and later and 
earlier experiences must be linked again and again (1952a, p. 56). The result is that past and 
present become more integrated in the patients mind, anxiety and guilt diminish, love and hate 
are better synthesized, splitting and repression lessen, the ego gains strength and coherence, the 
cleavage between idealized and persecutory objects diminishes, and unconscious phantasy life 
becomes less sharply divided from the conscious mind and can enrich the personality (1952a, p. 
56). As envy interferes so pervasively with the development of the healthy adult, it too must be 
treated; I explore this in the section of envy and its treatment, later in this chapter.  
Evidence in Kleinian theory 
 Psychoanalytic evidence has long been a subject of debate and dispute. There are no 
empirical studies on Kleinian theory in the strict sense of the word; at the same time, Klein was 
herself a kind of localized empiricist, using extensive case material and her own self-analysis to 
develop her theories. Hinshelwood describes Kleinian thought as so thoroughly framed in the 
patient’s own (unconscious, nonverbal) experiences that is it “difficult to communicate in a 
manner that is verifiable outside the particular analyst-patient relationship” (1991, p. 1). Juliet 
Mitchell notes that Klein “identifies and describes what intuitive identification and clinical 
observation are about: areas of confusion, fusion, lack of boundaries, of communicating without 
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the differential structures of speech” (1986, p. 31). In some of Klein’s papers, she used the work 
of infant researchers to back up her own theories of development and the mind; yet she qualified 
that use with her belief that “corroborative evidence…has its limitations, for, as we know, 
unconscious processes are only partly revealed in behavior, whether of infants or adults” (1952c, 
p. 94).  
Klein understood the difficulties of “proving” her theories, particularly with regard to 
infant life, writing in 1946 “The description of such primitive processes suffers from a great 
handicap, for these phantasies arise at a time when the infant has not yet begun to think in 
words” (p. 8). Yet, while she felt “hampered” in her study of infants by their inability to talk, she 
also believed that there are “many details of early emotional development which we can gather 
by means other than language” (1952c, p. 94). Thus, she considered her descriptions of 
unconscious phantasy to be “considered as pointers to the contents rather than to the form of 
such phantasies” (1945, p. 409). As I explore Klein’s work on envy and its treatment, the reader 
will note the creativity and risks that are present in theorizing (in words) the nonverbal, infantile 
experience. In sum, Klein’s work, on envy as on the preceding concepts, is both deeply clinically 
relevant and also difficult to “prove.”  
Envy in Kleinian theory: conceptualization and treatment 
 The concept of envy was Klein’s last major addition to her theoretical work. While she 
had been aware of envy in earlier papers, she did not make it a central concept until the 
publication of Envy and gratitude in 1957. Envy brings together many of Klein’s major concepts, 
takes them further and deeper, and fills in holes in her previous thought. This concept 
particularly seeks to answer a question that Klein and her colleagues, treating adults with 
schizophrenia, were trying to answer: why is it that some infants struggle to integrate the good 
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object and even appear to develop largely hostile relations with it? (Hinshelwood, 1991) Below, I 
discuss how Klein built on her developmental model, her theoretical constructs, and her 
innovations in technique to conceptualize envy and its many implications for treatment. 
The problem of envy 
 In keeping with Klein’s focus on infancy and the infantile experience in the adult, in her 
theory what is so harmful about envy is that it affects the early, primary relationship to the 
mother. As the breast is instinctively felt to be the source of nourishment and life, the infant must 
be able to cathect sufficiently to it (or to its symbolic representative, the bottle). This is how the 
mother develops into a loved object. “The good breast is taken in and becomes part of the ego, 
and the infant who was first inside the mother now has the mother inside himself” (1957, p. 179). 
Envy interferes with the process of internalizing the good object. It is “a destructive attack on the 
sources of life, on the good object, not on the bad object” (Hinshelwood, 1991, p. 167, italics in 
original). Envy, wrote Klein, is projective. The excessively envious infant seeks “to put badness, 
primarily bad excrements and bad parts of the self, into the mother, and first of all into her 
breast, in order to spoil and destroy her” (1957, p. 181). Envy interferes with splitting needed in 
the paranoid-schizoid position to internalize the good breast; in states of envy, splitting may not 
happen clearly enough (too fragmented) to protect the good breast, or the split may be too deep, 
idealizing the good breast but not making it available for integration. Klein also thought that 
envy leads to an early onset of guilt, which is overwhelming to an ego not yet capable of 
handling it. Guilt is thus felt as a persecution and the object that rouses guilt as a persecutor, 
which continues the cycle of envy as a harsh superego inflicts shame on the hapless infant. 
 Why does this happen? Klein believed that envy came from a mixture of environmental 
and constitutional factors. All infants, as I discussed earlier, make attacks in phantasy on the 
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breast. Envy seems to increase the intensity and duration of these attacks: this makes it more 
difficult for the infant to regain the lost good object (Klein, 1957). Externally, Klein pointed to 
factors such as the amount of oxygen available during the birth process, the availability of food 
and the mother, and the mother’s anxiety or enjoyment of taking care of the infant. “All these 
factors,” wrote Klein, “influence the infant’s capacity to accept the milk with enjoyment and to 
internalize the good breast” (1957, p. 179). Internally, or constitutionally, Klein associated envy 
with an overly strong and powerful death drive, as she considered envy to be closely associated 
with this instinct.  
Envy in the child and adult 
  Klein, as we have seen, believed in the infantile experience living on in the child and 
adult. She found that envious children and adults are affected in a variety of ways. Lacking a 
good and secure internal object and thus a strong capacity for love and gratitude, more seriously 
envious children struggle to bear the temporary states of envy, hatred, and grievance that arise in 
all children (Klein, 1957). Envy causes more intense and painful experiences of the Oedipus 
rivalry. As adults, envious people may feel insatiable: the “envy stems from within and therefore 
always finds an object to focus on” (Klein, 1957, p. 182). (Remember that “envy” caused by 
material deprivation that goes away when the material deprivation is resolved is not the kind of 
colloquial envy Klein is talking about.) 
 Envy is harmful to relationships and work as well. Klein believed that it is early 
experiences of enjoyment, love, and gratitude that facilitate unity with others later life. She cited 
the kind of interpersonal understanding which “needs no words to express it” as a demonstration 
of its origin in the early bond with the mother of the preverbal stage (Klein, 1957, p. 188). Envy 
blocks gratitude, which is intimately associated with the trust in good figures and one’s own 
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goodness. Klein linked gratitude with generosity, as the ability to give without feeling depleted 
because of “a feeling of inner wealth and strength” that comes from a securely internalized good 
object (1957, p. 189). She also noted that strong envy is projected onto a super-ego figure and 
becomes persecutory, interfering with thought processes, particularly creativity (Klein, 1957).  
Negative therapeutic reaction 
 Klein and her colleagues found that their new understanding of envy helped them to see 
why their treatment of adults was at times less successful than they would have expected. Klein 
noted that patients may criticize their analysts with real justification, and analyses may fail for a 
variety of reasons, but if envy can be understood as being at the root of a negative therapeutic 
reaction, more can be done to intervene. 
 Envy, because of its attack on the good object, causes confusion as to what is good and 
what is bad; this may lead to a patient remaining unsure for a very long time whether the analyst 
is a good or harmful figure. If the analyst is truly helpful, the overly envious patient may feel a 
need to devalue the analytic work he or she has experienced as helpful. More confusingly, the 
analytic setting may bring up in the patient “the original wish to please the mother, the longing to 
be loved, as well as the urgent need to be protected from the consequences of their own 
destructive impulses” such that the patient splits off her envy and hatred in order to present a 
more acceptable feeling side to the analyst (Klein, 1957, p. 185). Yet, the split off parts will 
continue to influence the course of the treatment, “which ultimately can only be successful if it 
achieves integration and deals with the whole of the personality” (Klein, 1957, p. 184). Part of 
dealing with a negative therapeutic reaction is recognizing and analyzing the defenses that 
patients will develop against their envy.  
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Defenses against envy 
 Klein saw the major defenses against envy as idealization, confusion between good and 
bad and general confusion, flight from the primary object to other people who are idealized and 
then devalued, devaluation of the object, devaluation of the self, greed, stirring up envy in others, 
and stifling feelings of love and tenderness. These will come up in the process of analysis and 
must be recognized and interpreted over time. Since the defenses against envy are meant to 
protect the patient against a fundamentally dangerous affect/experience, the analyst must be 
careful and gentle when working with them. In the following section, I explore some of the 
technique that Klein developed for dealing with envy, its manifestations, and the defenses 
against it.  
Implications for technique 
 Klein noted that sometimes when envy in adulthood arises, it activates the feeling of envy 
from its “earliest source” – understanding this, Klein believed, “may prove to be of great 
importance in the analysis of envy for only if it can reach down to its deeper sources is the 
analysis likely to take full effect” (1957, p. 190). Fundamentally, Klein discovered, it is only by 
“analyzing over and over again the anxieties and defenses bound up with envy and destructive 
impulses” that “progress and integration can be achieved” (1957, p. 231). She knew that patients 
sometimes consciously recognize their envy, jealousy, or competitiveness but believed that “only 
the analyst’s perseverance in analyzing these hostile feelings in the transference, and thereby 
enabling the patient to re-experience them in his earliest relation, can lead to the splitting within 
the self being diminished” (Klein, 1957, p. 232). Thus, the analyst’s role here is far more than 
bringing envy to consciousness; it is about the repeated interpretation of the anxieties, feelings, 
and defenses around it within the context of the analytic (standing in for primary) relationship. 
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 To be more specific, Klein gave examples of her work with envious adults from her 
practice. Through dream work and relentless analysis of the (particularly negative) transference, 
she found that her patients were able, gradually, to bring split off parts of themselves into their 
personalities. She sometimes found that there were delays: for example, she might interpret a 
dream as containing envious feelings, the patient may reject the interpretation, and yet, over 
time, the destructive impulses and envy will come more to the fore. Often, Klein noted that 
patients who have been able to work through their envy find that they can remember their 
infancies and childhoods with more complexity, accessing deeper love for their parents or 
siblings than they thought they had. With one patient, upon his realization of his envy and hate 
for Klein, he felt very depressed and unworthy for a time, before feeling better. Klein started to 
see this more and more often, and came to understand that such an experience can be “the result 
of an important step in the healing of the split between parts of the self, and thus a stage of 
progress in ego integration” (1957, p. 215). 
 Finally, Klein noted the importance of understanding the anxieties that prevent 
integration of parts of the self. “In dealing with this anxiety,” she wrote, “one should not 
underrate the loving impulses when they can be detected in the material. For it is these which in 
the end enable the patient to mitigate his hate and envy” (Klein, 1957, p. 226). The tenderness 
that both patient and analyst must access in this process can be difficult and painful; while Klein 
ruthlessly pursued the interpretation of the negative transference, she did not shy away from the 
love present between analyst and patient either. 
Notes of caution to the clinician 
 Klein believed envy to be more painful than any other experience that an analyst can 
interpret; helping a patient to face envy and hate “only becomes possible after long and 
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painstaking work” (Klein, 1957, p. 221). She warned that improvements, then setbacks, and 
always defenses should be expected. Klein noted that patients may experience greater integration 
as extremely dangerous and overwhelming. Feelings of love and dependence can be experienced 
as humiliating by the adult patient; conversely, he or she may cling to a strong positive 
transference and cover up split off hate and envy, as the ideal part of the self may be lost when 
split off parts are integrated.  
 Klein cautioned analysts to be slow and gradual as painful insights are again and again 
split off and regained until they gradually become more acceptable to the self (1957). She 
pointed out that the process makes great demands on patient and analyst, and that the analyst 
may feel a temptation to become a good mother figure that attempts to alleviate rather than 
understand the patient’s anxieties. Reassurance, Klein believed, is seldom successful because its 
effects do not last. “To help a patient to go through these deep conflicts and sufferings,” Klein 
wrote, “is the most effective means of furthering his stability and integration” (1957, p. 221).  
Conclusion 
 Klein’s deeply clinical, controversial work has had a tremendous effect on those who 
work psychoanalytically. Her model of mental development, her attempt to verbalize the 
nonverbal, her radical revisions of previous theoretical constructs, and her bold innovations in 
technique make her a vital voice for clinicians. Envy, as I have attempted to illustrate throughout 
this chapter, interfaces with and brings together many of her concepts. Her conceptualization and 
recommendations for the treatment of envy represent, in a sense, her most mature and fully 
developed contribution.  
 In the next chapter, I look at the work of Wilfred Bion, a Kleinian who was so 
theoretically innovative that some analysts now consider themselves “Bionian.” Bion began with 
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Klein’s concepts but changed them radically and invented his own. Bion’s model of the mind 
and its interaction with reality will allow us a different view of how envy may be conceptualized, 
understood in a wider context, and effectively treated. 
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CHAPTER V 
Bionian Envy 
 
Wilfred Bion (1897-1979) is often cited as one of the most innovative psychoanalytic 
theorists of the 21st century, and one who has had tremendous impact on contemporary 
psychodynamic and psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice. Author and psychotherapist Jean 
White describes how Bion “moved the Kleinian frame of reference into another register and 
constructed an entirely new theory of mind, which has had an extensive impact on contemporary 
psychoanalytic theory” (2006, p. 66). Contemporary Kleinian thought, according to Stephen 
Mitchell and Margaret Black, authors of a book on historical and current psychoanalytic theory, 
would be “more accurately designated Kleinian/Bionic” (1995, p. 102). French psychoanalyst 
André Green describes Bion as “the best example of an independent thinker in psychoanalysis” 
who “encouraged those who went to him to act in the same way” (1998, p. 649). In fact, and 
perhaps partially as a result of his independence, Bion’s work on containment, reverie, cognition, 
and other subjects has found its way (acknowledged or not) into the thought and clinical toolbox 
of many non-Kleinian clinicians.  
Bion was born in colonial India and went away to school in England as was the custom at 
the time at age eight. He never returned to India, although it remained an interest for the rest of 
his life. Bion was a decorated officer in the First World War. James Grotstein, a former 
analysand and the editor of a book of papers in his honor after his death, writes that Bion was 
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greatly influenced by his experience in the war: he “was never able to forget the horror of those 
experiences or ever able to surmount the miracle of his survival” (1983, p. 3). After the war, 
Bion studied medicine, becoming fascinated with groups and group therapy, largely through his 
work with veterans. Eventually, Bion became a psychiatrist and created a group approach that 
would become the influential Tavistock method (Semmelhack et al., 2013). Over time he grew 
more interested in psychoanalysis and decided to enter into a personal analysis with the classical 
analyst John Rickman, who later introduced him to Melanie Klein and recommended that he 
continue his analysis with her. Bion qualified as an analyst in 1947.  
Bion’s personal life contained serious losses. He was married after the First World War, 
but his wife died tragically shortly after the birth of their daughter. Bion later re-married, and his 
second wife, Francesca Bion, with whom he had two children, played an integral part in editing 
and publishing Bion’s posthumous contributions. 
Bion was analyzed by and studied under Melanie Klein, using, extending, and altering 
her ideas. As Mitchell and Black explain, Bion “became dissatisfied with the formulistic way 
many clinicians applied psychoanalytic concepts (including Kleinian concepts) and took a 
particular interest in trying to explore and convey the dense texture and ultimate elusiveness of 
experience” (Mitchell & Black, p. 102). Bion was president of the British Psycho-Analytic 
Society from 1962-1965 and became chairman of the Melanie Klein Trust when she died. Was 
he a Kleinian? When asked by Grotstein, Bion replied, “Heavens, no! I’m no more Kleinian than 
Melanie was. She always thought of herself as a Freudian, but Anna (Freud) saw to it that she 
would be labeled ‘Kleinian’” (1983, p.31).  
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Contemporary object relations psychoanalyst Thomas Ogden (2004) divides Bion’s work 
into two periods: his earlier work up to and including Learning from experience (1962) and his 
later work, Elements of psycho-analysis (1963) and everything after. Ogden writes:  
The experience of reading early Bion generates a sense of psychoanalysis as a never-
completed process of clarifying obscurities and obscuring clarifications, which enterprise 
moves in the direction of a convergence of disparate meanings. In contrast, the 
experience of reading Bion’s later work conveys a sense of psychoanalysis as a process 
involving a movement toward infinite expansion of meaning (2004, p. 285).   
Bion’s later work, while fascinating and sometimes bizarre (as in his foray into psychoanalytic 
fiction writing), is less relevant to the study of envy and its treatment. His earlier work is very 
much focused on this topic, however; thus, for the purposes of this study, I use only Bion’s work 
up to and including Learning from experience (1962) (in Seven Servants, 1977).  
 In this chapter I divide Bion’s early work again into two periods. In the first he was trying 
to figure out the mental functioning of psychotic patients using Kleinian theory; these are the 
1950s papers on psychosis. Here Bion described particular manifestations of splitting and 
projective identification and the switching of thought and action that he saw clinically in his 
treatment of schizophrenic patients. In these papers he began to create theories to explain what 
he noted in these clinical experiences, i.e., the necessity for projective identification to be 
“contained” in infancy; the attacks on links when envy, hatred, and uncontained projective 
identification are simultaneously present; and the arrested development that results. In his book 
Learning from experience and paper, The psycho-analytic study of thinking, both published in 
1962, Bion became more focused on the analytic situation. How does the analyst observe mental 
functioning in the analytic situation? How does he or she make sense of what is happening on a 
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moment-to-moment basis? Bion attempted to develop a set of tools -- a set of hypotheses on 
cognition and the models of alpha-function; alpha- and beta-elements; the contact-barrier; and L, 
H, and K links to help analysts have a common set of functions and models with which to talk 
about clinical phenomena.  
 I then step back and discuss the role of evidence in Bion’s work: how did he know what 
he knew? I consider his criticism and questioning of ways of gathering evidence, his innovative 
solutions involving the creation of models and concepts before theories, his use of abstraction, 
and his care toward making theory- building clinically respectful. In both the papers on 
psychosis and the early 1960s work on cognition, Bion significantly extended, deepened, and 
revised Klein’s ideas about envy. For Bion, envy caused the mind to attack its links with objects 
and its own mental capacities. I discuss Bion’s conceptualization of envy through its links with 
–K (attacks on thinking) and the processes of evacuation and denudation. I also discuss envy’s 
effects: the destruction of feelings and alpha-function, the splitting of material and psychical 
comforts, the impossibility of satisfaction, and the negative therapeutic reaction. Finally, I 
explore how envy might be successfully worked with using a Bionian form of treatment. Bion 
suggested that the clinician working with an envious patient attempt to find meaning in the lack 
of meaning, allow for projective identification and the introjection of good objects, help the 
patient to realistically modify conduct, and understand and use transference and counter-
transference. 
The 1950s papers on psychosis 
 Bion spent the 1950s, his first full decade as an analyst, treating people who suffered 
from psychosis. Grotstein describes Bion’s “equipment” at the time:  
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Klein’s concepts of the death instinct, envy, greed, the paranoid-schizoid and depressive 
positions and the schizoid mechanisms (splitting, idealization, magic omnipotent denial, 
and projective identification) and Freud’s concepts of the life and death instincts, the 
pleasure/unpleasure principle, and two principles of mental functioning (primary process 
and the reality principle) (2009, p. 311).  
Bion’s patients were in large part far more severely ill than either Freud’s or Klein’s, and his 
approach to clinical observation and theory-building was different. Thus, during the 1950s, Bion 
amassed a variety of clinical observations drawn from his work with people suffering from 
psychosis and created a highly original theory of psychosis (in which envy plays an important 
part) based on those observations.  
Clinical observations: splitting, projective identification, switching thought and action 
 In working with people with psychosis, Bion noted a “minute fragmentation of the 
personality, particularly of the apparatus of awareness of reality” (1957, p. 267) – an intense, 
disorganized form of splitting that led to excessive projective identification into external objects. 
Bion cited examples, such as the patient who attempted to “split” him by making him give two 
opposite interpretations at once; the patient then asked, “‘How does the lift know what to do 
when I press two buttons at once?’” (1954, p. 114), and the patient who spoke drowsily, 
attempting to put the analyst to sleep, while in some other way stimulating the analyst’s 
curiosity: “the intention is again to split the analyst, who is not allowed to go to sleep and is not 
allowed to keep awake” (1954, p. 114).  
 Splitting is closely related to projective identification, in which parts of the personality of 
the patient are split off and projected into the object “where it becomes installed, sometimes as a 
persecutor, leaving the psyche from which it has been split off correspondingly impoverished” 
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(Bion, 1956, p. 344). Bion described the way that, in psychosis, words are used as “things” 
which the patient “pushes forcibly” into the analyst (1954, p. 113). Bion linked excessive 
projective identification to situations in which death instincts predominate (1959), highlighting 
its intensely aggressive nature. He used as an example a patient who “felt he got inside me at the 
beginning of each session and had to be extricated at the end of it” (Bion, 1954, p. 113).  
 Bion also noted the psychotic patient’s apparent switching of thought and action. He 
observed that thought was often “evacuated,” as in excessive projective identification, and that 
his patients showed a preference for action at times when a more neurotic patient would realize 
that what was required was thought (1954). Bion found that the same problem was true in the 
opposite direction: “Reciprocally, if he has a problem the solution of which depends on action, as 
when, being in one place, he should be in another, he will resort to thought—omnipotent 
thought—as his mode of transport” (1954, p. 113). Bion’s next step was to create theoretical 
hypotheses for such clinical phenomena. These theoretical hypotheses, first about psychosis and 
later about the mind in general, are a foundational piece of Bion’s conceptualization of envy.  
Theories about psychosis: necessary containment of projective identification and developmental 
arrest 
 
 Bion originally believed that psychosis was due to “violent splitting and projective 
identification of the patient’s thoughts and of the mind which links the thoughts” (Grotstein, 
1981, p. 503). Gradually, he began to radically change his thoughts on the cause of psychosis. He 
came to think that psychosis might be due to the infant’s inability to split-off and project 
adequately because of a lack of a “container” to contain the projections. Bion theorized that 
projective identification makes it possible for people to “investigate” their own feelings “in a 
personality powerful enough to contain them” (1959, p. 314). This was a new and different way 
of viewing projective identification, one that paralleled contributions being made by D.W. 
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Winnicott and W.R.D. Fairbairn and anticipated the later work of Kohut (Grotstein, 1981) in its 
emphasis on the necessity of interpersonal containment of intense affects.  
 Bion hypothesized that this mechanism could not function if the mother could not or 
would not serve as a “repository” for the infant’s feelings, or if the patient’s hatred and envy 
could not allow the mother to receive and contain the projections (1959). The result, Bion 
thought, was a destructive attack, “which the patient makes on anything which is felt to have the 
function of linking one object with another” (1959, p. 308). Rather than a way to use the more 
developed personality of another to contain fear and other strong affects, projective identification 
becomes a mechanism “employed by the psyche to dispose of the ego fragments produced by its 
destructiveness” (1959, p. 308). Furthermore, Bion theorized   
Thanks to a denial of the main method open to the infant for dealing with his too 
powerful emotions, the conduct of emotional life, in any case a severe problem, becomes 
intolerable. Feelings of hatred are thereupon directed against all emotions 
including hate itself, and against external reality which stimulates them. It is a short step 
from hatred of the emotions to hatred of life itself (1959, p. 314).  
This “hatred of emotion” and the additional need to avoid awareness of it (1959, p. 310) leads to 
what Bion called “attacks on linking” – of thoughts, on the mental apparatus that thinks the 
thoughts, and of the links between objects. The next period of Bion’s work deepened this 
question, and Bion proposed tools to help psychoanalysts to think and talk about emotional 
experience and cognition. His emphasis on the role of envy, while already key in the disruption 
of normal projective identification, grew as he developed this language and toolkit in the early 
1960s.  
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Learning from experience and the psycho-analytic study of thinking 
 In the early 1960s, Bion went deeper into the analytic situation. He found that 
psychoanalysis was lacking language to describe the clinical phenomena he was observing, and 
began to develop a set of tools he believed would help analysts to have a common language to 
describe clinical phenomena. The most important tools (concepts and models) he developed were 
a set of hypotheses about cognition, followed by the concepts of alpha-function, alpha- and beta-
elements, the contact-barrier, and L, H, and K links. In this section, I describe the cognition 
hypotheses and each of the concepts. The reader will find that Bion himself links much of this 
work to the concept of envy; I highlight the connections throughout.   
 Kleinian psychoanalyst Donald Meltzer has an important warning to the reader of Bion’s 
work in this period: 
It is more useful to think of these [alpha and beta elements and functions] as his strategy 
than to mistake them for theories. That would be to misunderstand quite completely the 
nature of Bion’s work for the next fifteen years, which is devoted to trying to fill these 
empty concepts with meaning (2008, p. 308). 
The idea here is to name these functions and models and then to begin to create theories about 
what they are describing; the functions and models are not the theories themselves. Bion himself 
warned the reader: “The theory of functions and alpha-function are not a part of psycho-analytic 
theory. They are working tools for the practicing psycho-analyst to ease problems of thinking 
about something that is unknown” (1962/1977, p. 89). I discuss this unique method in the 
evidence section later in this chapter.  
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Hypotheses about cognition 
 In a similar fashion to the tools that follow, Bion’s hypotheses about cognition were 
meant to help the reader to think about thinking. Note, in the quotation that follows, Bion’s 
acknowledgement of all he does not know: 
It is convenient to regard thinking as dependent on the successful outcome of two main 
mental developments. The first is the development of thoughts. They require an apparatus 
to cope with them. The second development, therefore, is of this apparatus that I shall 
provisionally call thinking (1962, p. 306).  
Rather than assuming he understood what “apparatus” deals with thoughts, Bion took a step 
backward, calling into question cognitive processes and at the same time attempting to clarify 
something about those processes—particularly, that “thinking has to be called into existence to 
cope with thoughts” (1962, p. 306). Psychopathology, Bion posited, can be associated with one 
of the phases (the development of thoughts; thinking) or both. A capacity for tolerating 
frustration, he believed, “enables the psyche to develop thought as a means by which the 
frustration that is tolerated is itself made more tolerable” (Bion, 1962, p. 307). Recall Ogden’s 
description of early Bion as “a never-completed process of clarifying obscurities and obscuring 
clarifications” (2004, p. 285) – the work on cognition perhaps exemplifies this process more than 
any other part of Bionian theory. I return to the link between tolerating frustration and thinking 
in the section on envy later in this chapter.  
Alpha-function 
 Alpha-function was Bion’s first foray into the description of a “function” that he did not 
fully understand but observed clinically. The idea is crucial in understanding what fails in the 
 59 
envious individual. Bion chose the name alpha-function in order to talk about it without being 
restricted and warns against the premature investment of meaning: 
Since the object of this meaningless term is provide psycho-analytic investigation with a 
counterpart of the mathematicians variable, an unknown that can be invested with a value 
when its use has helped to determine what that value is, it is important that is should not 
be prematurely used to convey meanings, for the premature meanings may be precisely 
those that is essential to exclude (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 3). 
Alpha-function takes place in sleep and in waking life. Bion believed that emotional experiences 
must be “worked upon by alpha-function before they can be used for dream thoughts” 
(1962/1977, p. 6). Alpha-function is also crucial to learning from experience: “alpha-function 
must operate on the awareness of the emotional experience; alpha-elements are produced from 
the impressions of the experience; these are thus made storeable (sic) and available for dream 
thoughts and for unconscious waking thinking” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 8). Reverie, the mother’s 
“state of mind which is open to the reception of any ‘objects’ from the loved infant’s projective 
identifications whether they are felt by the infant to be good or bad” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 36) 
and which is so important to the infant’s ability to use healthy projective identification, is a 
“factor of the mother’s alpha-function” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 36). Meltzer believes that Bion’s 
“myth of alpha-function is intended to provide an apparatus which can afford the personality the 
kind of experience from which comes a ‘feeling of confidence’ at discerning the truth” (2008, p. 
319).  
 Bion also saw alpha-function as a useful tool in describing when it didn’t work. Alpha-
function, he felt, could be attacked and even function in reverse. Clinically, Bion found that: 
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Attacks on alpha-function, stimulated by hate or envy, destroy the possibility of the 
patient’s conscious contact either with himself or another as live objects. Accordingly we 
hear of inanimate objects, and even of places, when we would normally expect to hear of 
people (1962/1977, p. 9). 
Thus, we find that one of the reasons that Bion saw envy as so important and dangerous is its 
role in attacking alpha-function, which is crucial in somehow changing emotional experience 
into something that can be used for thinking.  
Alpha- and beta-elements 
 On what exactly does alpha-function work? Bion conceived of alpha- and beta-elements 
as a way to give language (again, like the mathematician’s variable) to the types of things that 
are worked on by alpha-function and turned into something else. Beta-elements, which have not 
yet been worked on by alpha-function, are “not amenable to use in dream thoughts but are suited 
for use in projective identification. They are influential in producing acting out” (Bion, 
1962/1977, p. 6). Beta-elements are “not felt to be phenomena, but things in themselves” (Bion, 
1962/1977, p. 6). They are “not so much memories as undigested facts” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 7) 
and cannot be repressed, suppressed, or used for learning (Bion, 1962/1977).  
 Alpha-elements (beta-elements which have undergone alpha-function) “have been 
digested by alpha-function and thus made available for thought” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 7). Alpha-
elements “comprise visual images, auditory patterns, olfactory patterns, and are suitable for 
employment in dream thoughts, unconscious waking thinking, dreams, contact-barrier, memory” 
(Bion, 1962/1977, p. 26) – they are felt to be phenomena that can, to some degree, be symbolized 
rather than “things in themselves” (beta elements) which cannot (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 6). Alpha-
elements also make up the contact-barrier, which separates conscious from unconscious. Envy’s 
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interference with beta-elements becoming alpha-elements and forming a functional contact-
barrier is, in Bion’s model, its most destructive aspect.   
The contact-barrier 
 This crucial contact-barrier, with which envy can dangerous interfere, is a “supposed 
entity” that “marks the point of contact and separation between conscious and unconscious 
elements” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 17). The contact-barrier is formed when “alpha-function whether 
in sleeping or waking transforms the sense-impressions related to an emotional experience, into 
alpha-elements, which cohere as they proliferate to form the contact-barrier” which is “thus 
continuously in the process of formation” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 17). Bion had an interesting way 
of describing the many possibilities he imagined: 
The nature of the contact-barrier will depend on the nature of the supply of alpha-
elements and on the manner of the relationship to each other. They may cohere. They 
may be agglomerated. They may be ordered sequentially to give the appearance of 
narrative (at least in the form in which the contact-barrier may reveal itself in a dream). 
They may be ordered logically. They may be ordered geometrically (1962/1977, p. 17).  
Thus, the contact barrier separates and connects the conscious and unconscious and is made of 
alpha-elements. Conscious and unconscious can sometimes be seen as in conflict in some way; 
Meltzer describes the way in which a person might feel confident that he or she is seeing the 
truth, “not of the thing-in-itself, but of one’s own emotional experience of it” through “binocular 
vision” – both conscious and unconscious vertices (2008, p. 320). The contact-barrier seems to 
be the essential place where this happens. If it does, Meltzer believes, “testing in action” (acting 
out) is not necessary (2008, p. 320). The link with acting out is another reason the contact-barrier 
is so important and that envy is so dangerous.  
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L, H, and K links 
 L, H, and K are another notational system that Bion created in an attempt to identify 
different types of links and explore how each one functions.  Again, the model helps the clinician 
to understand with what development envy interferes. L, H, and K links stand for “X loves Y, X 
hates Y, [and] X knows Y,” respectively (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 43). Bion proposed the links as 
“states” rather than finalities. It is not that “x is in possession of a piece of knowledge called y” 
but rather that “x is in the state of getting to know y and y is in a state of getting to be known by 
x” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 47). This is perhaps particularly important when it comes to the K link:  
If the learner is intolerant of the essential frustration of learning he indulges in phantasies 
of omniscience and a belief in a state where things are known. Knowing something 
consists in “having” some “piece of” knowledge and not in what I have called K” (Bion, 
1962/1977, p. 65). 
-K, the opposite of K, is “concerned with the evasion of K and the emotional experience it 
represents” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 48). He acknowledged the great emotional difficulty inherent in 
learning (remember from the literature review that envy is often an important thwarter of the 
ability to learn): 
The question ‘How can x know anything?’ expresses a feeling; it appears to be painful 
and to inhere in the emotional experience that I represent by x K y. An emotional 
experience that is felt to be painful may initiate an attempt either to evade or to modify 
the pain according to the capacity of the personality to tolerate frustration” (Bion, 
1962/1977, p. 48). 
Thus, according to Bion, the ability to learn from (emotional) experience—truth—seems to be 
“essential for psychic health” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 56). When it is interfered with, the effects are 
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disastrous.  Later in this chapter I explore envy’s effects on L, H, and K; first, I examine the 
question of evidence in Bionian theory.  Before I move on to envy and its treatment, I explore the 
important question of Bionian “evidence”: how did Bion know what he knew, and how does that 
impact how we understand and use his work? 
Evidence in Bionian theory 
 Bion was unusually thoughtful about questions of how he believed he knew what he 
knew, as one might expect, given that so much of Bion’s thinking is about thinking itself. He is 
notable for his criticism and questioning of his methods of gathering evidence, his innovative 
solutions involving models and concepts before theories and his use of abstraction, and his care 
toward making theory building clinically respectful. As I ask the clinician to consider Bion’s 
original and sometimes surprising theoretical constructions and treatment recommendations later 
in this study, it is important to understand first how it is that Bion came to the conclusions he did.  
Criticizing and questioning his methods of gathering evidence 
 Bion consistently criticized and questioned his methods and the limitations he faced in 
gathering evidence. In the introduction to Learning from experience, he wrote: 
The methods in this book are not definitive. Even when I have been aware that they are 
inadequate I have often not been able to better them. I have found myself in a similar 
position to the scientist who continues to employ a theory that he knows to be faulty 
because a better one has not been discovered to replace it” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. iv).  
He saw the problem as pervasive in all human endeavors, saying that “the capacity to think is 
rudimentary in all of us” and thus all investigation is limited by human inadequacy (Bion, 
1962/1977, p. 14). Bion questioned even the accepted scientific method, writing, “its weakness 
may be closer to the weakness of psychotic thinking than superficial scrutiny would admit” 
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(Bion, 1962/1977, p. 14). He explored how psychoanalytic theory, as a mixture of observed 
material and abstraction from it, can be at once too theoretical and too concrete (Bion, 1963). 
Ultimately, he believed that those concerned with the establishment of facts work from a failure 
to ascertain facts, “and so involve investigation of the nature of a failure” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 
66).  
Innovative solutions: models and concepts before theory, abstraction 
 In response to his own criticisms of theory building, Bion found two resourceful ways to 
deal with the problems identified in the previous section. His functions and models (alpha-
function, alpha- and beta-elements, contact-barrier, L, H, and K links) all served to allow Bion to 
“proceed with the communication without having to wait for discovery of the missing facts and 
without making statements that might appear to suggest that the facts were already known” 
(Bion, 1962/1977, p. 19). Thus he was able to talk about clinical phenomena that he wanted to 
describe but could not yet fully explain. One recalls Klein’s use of words to describe preverbal 
states: it is another attempt to describe that which cannot be fully understood or verbalized.  
 Bion also described his process of abstraction and why it was so important to his writing 
and thinking (1962/1977). He considered abstraction to be essential, opposing it to concretization 
(Bion, 1962/1977). Abstraction is reason and motivation to continue to create.  As Bion stated it, 
“the fact that any realization only approximates to the representation, be it abstraction or model, 
is the stimulus for further abstraction and further model making” (1962/1977, p. 65). As the 
reader considers the question of envy and its treatment, Bion’s writing encourages a constantly 
opening mind to new possible ways of understanding the complex problem and possible 
solutions.   
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Theory building as clinically respectful 
 Bion was careful not to assume that his models held true for all individuals. As he wrote, 
“The analyst has to concern himself with two models, one that he is called upon to make and the 
other implicit in the material produced by the patient” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 87). As an example, 
Bion often used a digestive model—as in “undigested facts”—yet he recognized that 
(i)nvestigation of mental development shows that some individuals behave as if their 
model of thinking was not that of a healthy digestive system or perhaps of a digestive 
system at all. It is therefore necessary to discover what their model is (1962/1977, p. 82).  
Such a humble posture toward knowing the nature of someone else’s experience served Bion 
well as theorist and clinician. As the clinician uses Bionian theory, it is crucial never to believe 
that one’s preconceived models, even if developed through serious work and study, will explain 
every individual. Instead, particularly in such difficult clinical situations such as those involving 
envy, the clinician must work to understand each particular patient, letting his or her models and 
conceptual knowledge inform but not dictate the interaction. In the next section, where I explore 
a Bionian conceptualization of envy and its treatment, that humility will continue to be present in 
Bion’s theorizing and its basis in his clinical work.  
Bion’s conceptualization of envy 
 Bion began with a fundamental definition of psychoanalytic envy that was similar to 
Klein’s in the sense that there is an attack on a good object, paradigmatically the good breast, in 
which the breast and its contents are spoiled and destroyed. Mitchell and Black describe how 
Bion began to feel that there was a connection between psychotic fragmentation and Klein’s 
conceptualization of envious attacks, in which “what was attacked was not only the object itself 
but the part of the child’s own mind that was connected to the object and to reality in general” 
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(1995, p. 103). The link to the object is felt to be “unbearably painful” and prompts the envious 
person to attack not just the breast (good object) but also the mental capacities that connect him 
or her to the breast (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 103). Envy, they continue, for Bion “became a 
kind of psychological and autoimmunological disorder, an attack by the mind on itself” (Mitchell 
& Black, 1995, p. 103). In this section, I further explore Bion’s conceptualization of envy 
through its links with –K, evacuation and denudation, and its effects: the destruction of feelings 
and alpha-function, the splitting of material and psychical comforts, the impossibility of 
satisfaction, and the negative therapeutic reaction.  
–K, evacuation, and denudation 
Bion was clear that envy as described by Klein is the only reason that the phenomenon 
represented by –K should exist. Bion believed an infant’s greatest fear is that it is dying. The 
“model” he constructed for this situation is as follows: 
The infant splits off and projects its feelings of fear into the breast together with envy and 
hate of the undisturbed breast. Envy precludes a commensal relationship. The breast in K 
would moderate the fear component in the fear of dying that had been projected into it 
and the infant in due course would re-introject a now tolerable and consequently growth-
stimulating part of its personality. In –K the breast is felt enviously to remove the good or 
valuable element in the fear of dying and force the worthless residue back into the infant. 
The infant who started with a fear he was dying ends up by containing a nameless dread 
(Bion, 1962/1977, p. 96).  
Bion went on to explain that the violence of the emotion associated with envy and –K affects 
projective processes such that they basically cannot function: “Indeed it is as if the whole 
personality was evacuated by the infant” (1962/1977, p. 97). In envy, any object that is needed 
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(in this case, to contain the projection of the fear of dying) is felt to be bad because it “tantalizes” 
(Bion, 1962/1977). Thoughts and proto-thoughts are bad, needed objects and need to be gotten 
rid of. Bion believed that the problem “is solved by evacuation if the personality is dominated by 
the impulse to evade frustration and by thinking the objects if the personality is dominated by the 
impulse to modify the frustration” (1962/1977, p. 84). Thus envy is connected with evacuation 
by creating a situation in which fears and feelings are felt to be bad and cannot be contained or 
thought and are thus gotten rid of entirely. 
 Bion theorized that not only are thoughts and feelings evacuated in envious states, but 
“since the projection by the infant is also impelled by envy the projection is felt as an envious 
denudation of the psyche” (1962/1977, p. 97). Whereas in non-envious K, only the fear of dying 
would have been removed, in envious –K, there is “hardly any infant to re-introject or into whom 
the denuded fear of dying can be forced” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 97). This “negative container 
contained” relationship creates an “envious stripping or denudation of all good” (Bion, 
1962/1977, p. 97) which “asserts its superiority by finding fault with everything,” particularly 
any new development in the personality or sign of growth (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 98). The 
combination of envy, -K, evacuation, and denudation is a forceful one. The troubling results are 
the destruction of feelings and alpha-function, the splitting of material and psychic comfort, the 
impossibility of satisfaction, and the negative therapeutic reaction, which I discuss in detail in the 
next section.  
Effects of envy: destruction of feelings and alpha-function, splitting of material and psychic 
comfort, impossibility of satisfaction, and the negative therapeutic reaction 
 
 Bion described what he saw as the effects of envy. Overwhelmingly, he believed that 
“Failure to eat, drink or breathe properly has disastrous consequences for life itself. Failure to 
use the emotional experience produces a comparable disaster in the development of the 
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personality” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 42). The particular disaster envy causes begins with the 
destruction of feelings and of alpha-function, which has the potential to change feelings into 
something that can be thought about and accepted as emotional experience. Bion described the 
way that “fear, hate and envy are so feared that steps are taken to destroy awareness of all 
feelings” (1962/1977, p. 10). Further, envy aroused by the breast which provides “love, 
understanding, experience and wisdom, poses a problem that is solved by destruction of alpha-
function” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 11). If such good things as love and understanding cannot be 
used, they become devalued and thus the pain of envy is lessened.  
 The deflection of the need for love, understanding and mental development, because they 
are felt to be unable to be satisfied, turns into a search for material comfort (Bion, 1962/1977). 
Bion further developed this idea: 
This split, enforced by starvation and fear of death through starvation on the one hand, 
and by love and the fear of associated murderous envy and hate on the other, produces a 
mental state in which the patient greedily pursues every form of material comfort; he is at 
once insatiable and implacable in his pursuit of satiation (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 11). 
Since the striving for material comfort stems from a need to be rid of the awareness of emotional 
experience, it is impossible for any material to satisfy longing in this state. Not only do the “beta-
elements” (material comforts) being introjected (but not understood) fail to satisfy, they are in 
fact felt to be bad themselves. These mechanisms “fail to rid the patient of his pains, which he 
feels to be due to a lack of something” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 11). Sometimes, such a search may 
bring the envious person into therapy or analysis.  
 This state may lend itself to a negative therapeutic reaction, for various reasons. First, 
obviously, the patient’s –K (refusal/inability to learn) and disavowal/evacuation/denudation of 
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thoughts and feelings make analysis difficult. Second, the patient “uses an equipment suited for 
contact with the inanimate to establish contact with himself” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 12). There is a 
great difficulty in making contact with one’s own aliveness in this state. The attempt to evade 
contact with other live objects through destroying alpha-function creates a situation in which 
only beta-elements are available, and beta-elements cannot be used for thinking or feeling, only 
evacuation. Finally, the patient may feel that there are “no redeeming features in his 
environment,” including the analyst’s presence and interpretations (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 12). 
Still, Bion believed, “the patient does ultimately grasp some of the meaning of what is said to 
him” (1962/1977, p. 12). In the following section, I explore Bion’s suggestions to the practitioner 
working with a person who suffers from envy and its related states. 
Treatment of envy 
 Bion is an important figure in the treatment of people suffering from psychosis, envy, and 
other serious problems. Mitchell and Black note, “Bion’s formulations concerning attacks on 
meaning and linking and projective identification have provided powerful clinical tools in 
analytic work, particularly in the treatment of very disturbed patients” (1995, p. 108). Bion 
suggested that the clinician working with someone with envy find meaning in the lack of 
meaning, allow for projective identification and the introjection of good objects, help the patient 
to realistically modify conduct, and understand and use transference and counter-transference.  
Find meaning in the lack of meaning 
 Bion’s work to find meaning in the lack of meaning experienced in the treatment of 
severely disturbed people has been valuable to many clinicians. According to Mitchell and 
Black: 
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Bion’s formulations provide a framework for analysts to tolerate and, in fact, become 
fascinated with their reactions to such patients by establishing the following assumptions: 
the apparent meaninglessness of the communications is generated by an active 
destruction of meaning; the apparent hopelessness and disconnection are generated by an 
active intent to destroy hope and connection; the agonizing feelings generated by 
sustained contact with such persons are the product of primitive efforts on their part to 
communicate and share their tortured states of mind (1995, p. 108).  
Over time, disorganization and meaninglessness become more organized and meaningful 
through the analyst’s curiosity, containment, and interpretations. Eventually, such meaning and 
organization become, to some extent, part of the patient’s experience as well. Such meaning-
making actively works against the harsh corrosiveness and stripping functions of envy that make 
it so harmful.    
Allow for projective identification and the introjection of good objects  
 Bion was perhaps the first intersubjective analyst; he believed strongly in the therapeutic 
importance of projective identification and its reciprocal, the introjection of good objects 
(1962/1977). Grotstein gracefully sums up the process a Bionian analyst uses with a disturbed 
patient: 
Projective identification by the analysand optimally leads to containment by the object, 
who now, as subject, absorbs the analysand’s pain and then becomes it, one aspect of 
which is the analyst’s agreement to be it—that is, “wear” it—as its subjective identity so 
that the infant/patient can see that the project pain has “travelled” in psychic space from 
the subjectivity of the analysand to that of the analyst, while all the while the analyst is 
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dreaming it with alpha-function (processing or “metabolizing” it)” (2009, p. 307) (italics 
in original). 
The analyst does with the patient what could not be done in infancy (again, real and 
metaphorical) through the containment, absorption, becoming, and processing of painful 
thoughts and feelings and then the giving back of those thoughts and feelings in a more 
digestible form that can be safely introjected.  The containment of projective identification 
counteracts the feeling in the envious patient that emotional experience is too painful and links to 
objects as well as within the mind must be cut.  
Help the patient to realistically modify conduct 
 Envy, as I explored earlier, interferes with the process of learning. Bion observed that the 
disturbed patient “appears to have no appreciation of causation and will complain of painful 
states of mind while persisting in courses of action calculated to produce them” (1959, p. 314). 
He suggested that it is necessary to interpret to the patient his or her own lack of interest in 
learning why he or she feels or experiences things as he or she does. The patient’s gradual 
development of an understanding that he or she has not been curious about what is causing 
distress may help to bring about a greater sense of curiosity. Bion felt that this “leads to some 
modification of conduct which otherwise prolongs his distress” (1959, p. 314). 
Understand and use transference and counter-transference 
 Bion saw the transference of severely disturbed patients as closely resembling “the 
description given by Melanie Klein of the infant’s fantasied attacks on the breast” (1958, p. 145). 
Meltzer describes that transference as “an externalization of internal object relations under the 
pressure of the immediate operation of impulse and anxiety” (2008, p. 290). In other words, the 
patient’s attacks on the analyst, which resemble the infant’s fantasied/phantasied attacks on the 
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breast, are not even just representations, but actually externalizations, of primitive internal object 
relations and feeling states. The patient “inevitably and necessarily experiences the analyst and 
the analyst’s interpretations with profoundly intense hopes and equally intense dreads, through 
her unconscious organizations of experience” (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 106). Thus, as in 
Kleinian theory, working in the transference, positive and negative, is crucial to Bionian clinical 
work.  
 Perhaps some of Bion’s most original and valuable contributions are to the analyst’s use 
of counter-transference as a vehicle for recognizing, containing, absorbing, and processing 
painful thoughts and affects. As the analyst receives the patient’s projective identifications and 
metabolizes them, returning them in a newly digestible form, the analyst is exposed to and takes 
on disturbing states of mind and powerful anxieties. Mitchell and Black summarize such an 
interaction: “The patient’s intrapsychic fantasy becomes a form of interpersonal transaction that 
stimulates intense experiences in the analyst, whose countertransference offers clues to the 
patient’s unconscious fantasies” (1995, p. 108). In an envious patient, the interaction may be 
even more distressing to the analyst, whose attempts to be helpful and reparative are destroyed 
over and over by the patient who cannot accept such “good” offerings.  Thus, the clinician who 
is to work with very disturbed patients must be willing to undergo, observe, and use painful 
affects if the treatment is to succeed.  
Conclusion 
 Bion’s innovative work on splitting, projective identification, containment, and attacks on 
linking; his hypotheses on cognition; and his tools (alpha-function, alpha- and beta-elements, the 
contact-barrier, and L, H, and K links) make up a body of work that has influenced Kleinian and 
non-Kleinian clinicians alike. His careful and innovative solutions to problems of evidence and 
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his profound and complex conceptualization of envy and its treatment extend and deepen Klein’s 
work on the subject. Meltzer characterizes the experience of reading and using Bion well:  
Probably most people who have been deeply influenced in their clinical practice by 
Bion’s work have had the same experience, of initial irritation and suspicion followed by 
a long period during which they have only gradually discovered the evidence of his 
impact on their own observations and thought (2008, p. 301). 
His complexity and originality of thinking make him a difficult but deeply rewarding therapeutic 
guide.  
In the next chapter, I analyze and synthesize Kleinian and Bionian conceptualizations of 
envy and its treatment. I evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of this study, and I consider its 
implications for social work practice, policy, and research.  
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CHAPTER VI 
Discussion 
 
“One may consider envy to be an inherent category belonging to the death instinct, or even, as I 
think, of the life instinct as well—a prime, unavoidable affect and a reminder of one’s 
inadequacies and incompleteness” –James Grotstein, 2009, p. 253 
 
 
Throughout the other chapters of this study, I have often referred to the clinical utility of 
the theoretical material presented. In this chapter, I review the most important points of the 
phenomenon and each theory. In an extended case study, I synthesize Kleinian and Bionian 
thought to develop a conceptual understanding of the patient presented; I then discuss how one 
might successfully treat the patient using a therapy informed by the two theories. Finally, I 
consider the implications for social work practice, policy, and research.  
Envy, Klein, and Bion 
Envy 
 Psychoanalytic envy is not about lacking something that can be solved materially; rather, 
it is a far more complicated phenomenon. In the chapter on the concept of envy, I looked at envy 
as a deadly sin (Epstein, 2003), a highly disturbing experience that causes a wide range of 
individual, interpersonal, and societal problems. I considered envy’s effects from the perspective 
of many experienced clinicians and writers. Envy has harmful effects on interpersonal 
relationships and prevents reciprocal bonds between people (Etchegoyen & Nemas, 2003; 
Daniels, 1964-1965; Joseph, 1986; Barrows, 2002; Bonovitz, 2010). It plays an important role in 
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pathological projective processes; as such, the envious person can feel himself or herself to be 
surrounded by others who would destroy him or her with their envy (Berke, 1985; Joseph, 1986; 
Harris, 1997; Etchegoyen, et. al, 1987). Envy has a significant connection with narcissism and 
can be seen as a narcissistic defense (Berke, 1985; Etchegoyen, et.al, 1987; Spillius, 1993; 
Donner, 2006; Hailparn & Hailparn, 2000). It can lead to paranoia and a fear of success, and 
sometimes to destructive self-sabotage (Bonovitz, 2010; Joseph, 1986; Harris, 1997; Kavaler-
Adler, 2006).  
 Envy interferes with the development of the crucial feelings of admiration and gratitude 
(Sandell, 1993; Klein, 1957). It can block the development of a set of ethics from which one can 
live (Etchegoyen, et. al, 1987). Envy impedes the ability to give, receive, and appreciate (Joseph, 
1986; Etchegoyen & Nemas, 2003; Spillius, 1993; Fisher, 1989; Harris, 1997; Schultz, 1991; 
Schwartzberg, 2007). It can cause a process of concretization, in which problems become so 
“real” they are felt to be absolutely immovable (Anderson, 2011). Envy causes a perversion of 
desire and an inability to enjoy good things (Bonovitz, 2010; Joseph, 1986; Etchegoyen & 
Nemas, 2003). Its attacks on goodness can cause confusion and difficulties in learning (Joseph, 
1986; Daniels, 1964-1965; Harris, 1997; Spillius, 1993; Etchegoyen, et. al, 1987). Envy’s close 
relationship with shame and guilt causes pain that often brings people into contact with clinicians 
(Berke, 1986; Harris, 1997; Spillius, 1993). It makes it more difficult to tolerate frustration, and 
creates a situation in which getting the desired object or outcome does not alleviate the 
frustration (Etchegoyen, et. al, 1987). Envy is associated with low self-esteem, a feeling of 
worthlessness, and a sense that something internal and/or external is lacking (Daniels, 1964-
1965; Colman, 1991; Stein, 1990; Harris, 1997).  
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 Envy is such a painful feeling that people can be quite defended against it. Sometimes 
these defenses are what bring people into treatment, as they can be harmful and limiting 
themselves (Joseph, 1986; Spillius, 1993). Envy also has effects at a societal level; there are 
particularly important intersections between envy, gender, and racism (Ellman, 2000; Harris, 
1997; Einzig, 1980; Reichbart, 2006; Clarke, 2003; Rasmussen & Salhani, 2010).  
Klein 
 In the chapter on Klein, I discussed Klein’s original and unique vision of the mind: the 
“continually shifting, kaleidoscopic stream of primitive, phantasmagoric images, fantasies, and 
terrors” (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 87); the unconscious in which “time is spatial, not 
historical” and the unconscious is not constructed by repression (Mitchell, 1986, p. 28); and the 
“primitive elements” (Hinshelwood, 1991, p. 1) that are not easily described by words. I noted 
Klein’s concepts of phantasy (sic/unconscious fantasy), the internal world, and the necessity for 
the good “breast” to be taken in so that its goodness and wisdom can be unconsciously drawn on 
in order to face the difficulties inherent in development. Envy interferes with taking in good 
objects; in states of envy, the good breast is thus idealized but not assimilated, and excessive 
splitting and projective identification impoverish the ego. In such a situation paranoid-schizoid 
mechanisms predominate, and the envious person cannot tolerate depressive anxieties or 
mourning processes. The healthy adult is able to learn, work, and love without feeling attacked 
by bad internal and external objects; the envious adult must manage persecutory anxiety through 
primitive defenses.  
Klein saw envy as a manifestation of the death instinct. She found that it dangerously 
influences the development of a harsh, shaming superego and interferes with Oedipal processes 
due to its sabotage of the desire to learn and grow, its creation of premature guilt and shame, and 
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the way that it makes it more difficult to tolerate object relations with whole people. Without 
good internal objects to draw on, badness is felt to come from within and is projected outward. 
The envious person feels simultaneously depleted and attacked, and struggles to love, learn, and 
think.  
Klein was well aware of the difficulty that envy presented to the therapeutic process. She 
believed that, in any treatment, “the whole gamut of love and hatred, anxiety, grief and guilt in 
relation to primary objects” must be experienced again and again (1950, p. 46) in order for split 
off pieces of the self to become integrated, for love and hate to be better synthesized, for the ego 
to gain strength and coherence, and for the split between idealized and persecutory objects to 
diminish (1952a, p. 56). In the treatment of a person experiencing envy, Klein recommended 
relentless analysis of the positive and negative transference and caution in pacing interpretations 
about envy as the analyst helps the patient work to integrate his or her love and hate. 
Bion 
 In the chapter on Bion, I looked at the way that Bion used, extended, and altered Klein’s 
ideas in his attempt to “explore and convey the dense texture and ultimate elusiveness of 
experience” (Mitchell & Black, p. 102). Bion’s work with people with psychosis led him to 
create a complex theory of splitting and projective identification. While he agreed with Klein 
that excessive and/or disorganized splitting leads to extreme projective identification that 
impoverishes the ego, he came to feel that the root was in infancy, when the infant cannot 
adequately project into a containing object (mother) that can digest the infant’s most distressing 
feelings and fears and return them in a more manageable form. Bion, like Klein, believed that the 
problem could be external (a caregiver who cannot contain and manage the projections), internal 
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(envy, i.e., not allowing the mother to receive and contain the projections), or a combination of 
the two.  
Bion also associated excessive projective identification and envy with the death instinct. 
The “hatred of emotion” and need to avoid awareness of it (1959, p. 310) as well as an inability 
to tolerate frustration leads to attacks on links with objects and on the mind and its own ability to 
think. In addition to interfering with relationships and cognition, envy disrupts the process of 
changing emotional experience into something that can be learned from and thought about 
(alpha-function) and prevents the growth of a functional contact-barrier between the conscious 
part of the mind and the unconscious. According to Bion, envy -- a corrosive, denuding force 
that strips all possibilities for development and connection of their meaning -- is associated with 
–K, an omnipotent inability to learn from experience. Feelings and thoughts are thus evacuated 
rather than tolerated, and the splitting of material and psychic comforts make any feeling of real 
satisfaction impossible.  
Bion too recognized the difficulty of working therapeutically with the envious patient. 
His conceptualizations led to the clinical wisdom that one must find meaning in the lack of 
meaning: links to objects and thoughts and feelings themselves are actively destroyed; the 
hopelessness and meaninglessness that can be felt in the treatment is itself a form of projective 
identification, an attempt by the patient to share his or her state of being. Bion believed that the 
analyst had to contain, digest, and become the patient’s projections before allowing the patient to 
re-introject his or her own thoughts and feelings in a now-safer form along with the good object 
of the analyst from which to draw in the future. Like Klein, Bion suggested patience: the 
clinician must be willing to undergo, again and again, painful affects and experiences within the 
self in order to successfully treat a person who suffers from envy.  
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Synthesis using an extended clinical example 
 The use of case material for analysis and synthesis presents the writer with a complex and 
challenging task: each person with whom one comes into clinical contact is so multifaceted; 
history and behavior is by its nature polyvalent; and the clinician-writer faced with applying 
theoretical models to real people must continue to be aware that such an application is a 
hypothesis. There will always be conflicting possibilities. Yet, using theory with clinical material 
presents an important opportunity for therapeutically relevant integration. In that spirit, I present 
a case in which I synthesize the Kleinian and Bionian conceptualizations of envy, its effects, and 
its potential treatment.  
Clinical example: Mariana  
 Mariana is a fifteen-year-old student at a public high school in a large city in the 
northeast. She is of Dominican descent and was born in the United States. Mariana’s mother 
returned to the Dominican Republic shortly after Mariana’s birth and left her in the care of her 
maternal grandmother; she does not know her father. Mother and daughter see one another in the 
Dominican Republic during the summers. Mariana speaks Spanish at home with her 
grandmother and is fluent in English. She identifies as heterosexual and female and does not 
practice a religion (although her grandmother is Catholic). Her family’s financial status is stable.  
Mariana has a complicated psychological/behavioral history. She has seen various 
therapists and had psychological testing. Her psychological evaluation identified Mariana as 
“mildly mentally retarded,” a diagnosis that seemed to be both inaccurate and harmful, as she 
was aware of the diagnosis and explained that the “retardation” was “inside of her” and “couldn’t 
come out.” She has taken medication in the past, which made her sleepy and without an appetite. 
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Since she stopped taking the medication she has been much hungrier and gaining some weight, 
something that in different moments she seems to alternately delight in or be bothered by. 
 In school, Mariana struggles academically and socially. She is often disruptive in classes 
and sent to the SAVE room (an in-school suspension), and she is failing several of her ninth-
grade classes. Her teachers maintain that the reason for her failing is behavioral, and that when 
she concentrates she can do the work. Mariana can be very charming in certain moments, funny 
and self-aware, and in others mean, insulting others in ways that often provoke anger. Mariana 
has difficult relationships with other students. She has been in a handful of physical fights with 
both male and female peers and struggles to maintain friendships, though she seems to desire 
closeness with others. She has sexual thoughts and feelings about male students, and has started 
to be physically involved with an older student. Sexual contact seems to be both something she 
wants and fears.   
Kleinian/Bionian conceptualization 
 A Kleinian/Bionian conceptualization of Mariana provides much more depth and 
possibility for treatment than a diagnosis of mental retardation. Mariana shows intelligence and a 
strong capacity for schoolwork in some moments while in others she is disruptive, destructive, 
paranoid, and confused. Kleinian/Bionian envy accurately describes many of Mariana’s 
symptoms and helps to explain why it was that non-psychoanalytically informed therapy, 
medication, and discipline were so unhelpful to her and what might have been more helpful.  
 Mariana’s grandmother, based on Mariana’s stories, seemed to have been resistant to 
raising her daughter’s daughter. One can imagine the ways in which she might not have been the 
primary, good caregiver that Mariana needed as an infant. Klein and Bion believed that internal 
and external forces influence envy; perhaps Mariana was in some way predisposed to being 
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aggressive or destructive, and perhaps her development was strongly influenced by the loss of 
her mother and the lack of a full replacement. Klein would have emphasized the lack of a good, 
consistent internal object from which to draw in moments of difficulty. Bion would have noted 
the way that Mariana would not have been able to project her greatest fear, the fear of dying, as 
an infant. Without having that fear metabolized by another person who could return it to her in a 
more tolerable form, she would have been left with a “nameless dread” (Bion, 1962/1977, p. 96) 
rather than a felt experience that terror can be survived with the help of a containing outside 
presence. It is impossible to parse out what might have been infant-Mariana’s inability to project, 
allow her caregiver to process, and return her feelings, and/or her inability to internalize a good 
object from which to unconsciously draw in difficult moments. Development always contains a 
mixture of nature and nurture (nature here would be the presence of a strong death instinct, or a 
particularly aggressive or destructive constitution; nurture, the primary relationship with an early 
caregiver). Regardless, Mariana entered adolescence with symptoms reflecting a harsh internal 
world and the corrosive, denuding effects of envy.  
 As so often is the case in envy, Mariana’s internal world seems to be full of internal 
persecutors. She sometimes yells, “stop looking at me” while walking in the hallways when there 
is no one there, and she suspects that others will hurt or abandon her, as her parents did. Her 
fantasies about boys are about devouring them (“I’ll kiss him whether he likes it or not!”) or 
them devouring her. In social relationships, a deep unconscious phantasy related to early 
persecution and abandonment is felt to repeat and made to repeat externally. Envy is a force that 
can keep someone in the paranoid-schizoid position, in which “the problem of inherent human 
destructiveness is resolved through projection, resulting in an ominous sense of persecution, 
danger from others” (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 95). While some of the dangers Mariana faces 
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and has faced are real (external), she imagines that teachers want to fail her (when they are often 
quite invested in her passing) and that other students want to beat her up (more often, she wants 
to beat them up; the threats come from within, not from outside). Mariana’s projections and 
subsequent accusations have real effects on her relationships, and students in particular are afraid 
of her and avoid her. In Bionian terms, envy’s effect on Mariana’s ability to tolerate frustration 
forces her attack her links with other people and with her own mind, her ability to think. The 
“confusion” surrounding her relationships (often summed up by the question, who wants to hurt 
who?) can be attributed to her attacks on linking.  
 Klein and Bion both note in different ways the blocks that envy creates for development. 
Klein believed that people shift back and forth between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive 
positions in different moments, and that envy makes it much more difficult to remain mostly in 
the depressive position, in which one can mourn losses and fear hurting loved objects. Mariana 
has moments in which she feels depressive anxieties and regret for hurting people she cares 
about; she sometimes makes genuine apologies after insulting or yelling at someone. More often, 
though, she feels persecuted by her own bad internal objects, projected outward, and experiences 
everyone as out to get her; she is then unable to see her part in hurting others and cannot repair 
the relationship. Bion calls the failure to see what has happened –K, non-thinking: the inability to 
learn from experience. In –K, thoughts and feelings are evacuated rather than understood. This 
interferes with relationships and with cognition. This kind of confusion, Klein might add, stems 
from the original problem of envy, hatred of the good object. Such a fundamental confusion 
necessarily leads to confusional states later in life in which the envious person feels unable to 
figure out what has happened in relationships and what would have to happen in order to make 
them better.  
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 Bion’s highly theoretical ideas about the mind can be seen clinically in Mariana’s 
presentation. He theorized that envy interferes with the process of turning emotional experience 
into something that can be learned from (alpha-function), and that if that process were disrupted, 
there could be no functional barrier between the conscious and unconscious parts of the mind 
(contact-barrier). Mariana often cannot distinguish her fantasies from reality: she sees people 
watching her when there is no one there, but then can agree that the hallway is empty (in other 
words, there is a confusion, internal mixing with external, but not a psychotic hallucination). She 
sometimes so badly wants for a boy to have kissed her that she seems to become convinced that 
he has; she then speaks about it as though it has happened, further alienating her peers. Lack of a 
functional barrier between conscious and unconscious also makes it difficult to separate her 
relationships from the past with her present relationships; for example, she quickly switches a 
girl who beat her up in elementary school with a girl toward whom she feels aggressive in high 
school. This lack of a barrier between fantasy, memory, and current reality contributes to a 
difficulty in reality-testing, a crucial ego function.   
 Klein found that envy creates a harsh, shaming superego, and a feeling of guilt before the 
ego is able to adequately handle that feeling. Bion might have added that such difficult emotions 
before the individual is ready to deal with them create a hatred of emotion itself, and a need to 
avoid awareness of it. Mariana’s superego is harsh, shaming, and ineffective: she does not follow 
rules, yet she is disgusted and ashamed by her own pleasure in eating or having pleasing 
daydreams about boys. Bion saw envy as corrosive and denuding, stripping meaning from the 
processes of learning, growth, and development. Often, when Mariana finds herself changing or 
developing, she attacks very the idea that she might be growing. For example, she responded to 
her guidance counselor appreciating that Mariana had been polite to her recently by calling her 
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fat and telling her she wished she would die: an extremely harsh attack on a relationship that has 
been growing closer, and a way of stripping the guidance counselor’s comment of its meaning. 
She responds similarly to succeeding at something in school. This is perhaps envy’s most 
harmful manifestation: the attacks on one’s own growth and development.   
 As noted earlier psychoanalytic envy is not about lacking something that a material good 
might solve. It is, as Adrienne Harris wrote, “fueled by a passion that seems unquenchable until 
the external world can be seen and experienced as devastated and ruined as the internal world” 
(1997, p. 312). Mariana finds ways to make others feel bad, often insulting their physical 
appearance or intelligence. She does small things to “ruin” the physical world around her, 
picking her nose and wiping it on the table, or breaking classroom materials. Mariana seems 
insatiable in her appetite, and often asks people for food, though she describes being well fed at 
home. Bion wrote about the splitting of material and psychic comforts in envy that makes real 
satisfaction impossible. In Kleinian terms, there can be no satisfaction as long as the internal 
world is barren or filled with persecutors. Until good, consistent objects are internalized, there 
can be no “getting full”: no lasting feeling of gratification from anything externally good.   
Proposal for treatment using Kleinian/Bionian theory 
 A clinician treating Mariana through a Kleinian/Bionian lens, acknowledging and 
working with her envy, would be far more successful than the disciplinary and behavioral lenses 
that have been used with her in school and therapy. According to a Kleinian/Bionian 
conceptualization and prescription, Mariana requires a long psychoanalytically informed 
treatment. Both Klein and Bion emphasized the way that the patient who suffers from envy or 
any other serious disturbance requires extensive clinical time -- for (1) love, hate, anxiety, and 
guilt to be experienced again and again within the self and in relationship with the analyst, as 
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they gradually become more integrated and for (2) meaninglessness and lack of connection and 
other extremely painful affects to be felt, processed, and contained by the analyst before they can 
be “given back” to the patient, their contents now in some way changed and more tolerable.  
 Both Klein and Bion would have recognized the harshness of Mariana’s internal world -  
the way that it seems to be full of persecutors. She had likely begun to feel intense guilt and 
shame before her ego was strong enough to handle these emotions. (Envy both causes and is a 
result of a feeling of shameful neediness.) As such, Mariana’s projective processes are intense 
and difficult to parse out. The clinician who takes her actions (insulting others, picking fights) 
concretely will shame or discipline her further, leading to more guilt and shame. Yet, what 
Mariana needs is exactly the opposite: someone who can understand that she is trying to show 
something about how bad things are for her internally when she makes others feel bad; a 
clinician who could contain, process, and work through that with her. The clinician’s acting out 
(responding harshly, or aggressively) to the patient’s projective identification, is, as Kleinian 
analyst Hanna Segal warns, “in effect a confirmation of the patient’s omnipotence and also an 
impoverishment of his personality through the losses incurred by such projections” (1964, p. 
120). Mariana’s projective processes are not calls for discipline but rather, an attempt to ruin the 
outside world as much as her inside world may feel ruined. When she does manage to ruin it (to 
cause everyone in her life to treat her with anger and frustration), she feels empty and attacked 
and unsatisfied. Until she is better able to integrate love and hate, to internalize a good, 
consistent object, overcome shame and guilt enough to want something good, and to learn from 
her experience in order to get it, she will be stuck in a cycle of projective, destructive processes.  
 The pain of accepting and working with, digesting, the Mariana’s painful emotional 
experiences and internal world would require great emotional capacity on the part of the clinician 
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who treats her. Both Klein and Bion understood how painful these experiences could be, and 
cautioned against too-quickly interpreting envy and other very painful repressed affects. 
Working in the transference is extremely important in this situation; that is where in Kleinian and 
Bionian thinking the work is done and the hatred, grief, and corroded emptiness are processed. 
Hatred of Mariana’s mother and father for leaving, grief at their absence, anger at her 
grandmother for not being a good enough caretaker, her own feelings of guilt and shame and 
emptiness at the state of her own self and her relationships -- all of these would need to come out 
in the relationship with the clinician as hatred and grief and anger toward and disconnection from 
the clinician.  Further, the negative transference would need to be interpreted and the painful 
feelings and the attacked broken thought processes accepted and shared by the therapist, who 
survives all of it.  
 The envious person’s superego is already much too harsh, and envy can force him or her 
to be concrete in thinking far too often. The common disciplinary measures based on behavior in 
school can thus be harmful to a student like Mariana. At the same time, concrete thinking and 
confusional states, particularly regarding thought and action, can create situations in which the 
patient requires more directive help from the clinician. Kleinian/Bionian treatment does not 
prohibit trying to understand the external world even as it most deeply seeks to work with the 
internal. Both Klein and Bion point to instances when thinking has become so concrete that 
problems that could get better through behavioral modifications are felt to be immovable. In that 
case, with enough rapport between patient and clinician, the clinician may help the patient to see 
ways in which his/her behavior affects external outcomes. It is a tricky line to balance, however; 
the possibility for blaming and shaming is quite real, and the last thing the envious patient needs 
is more guilt and shame.  
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Ultimately, much of a Kleinian/Bionian treatment for someone like Mariana would 
involve a long process of projection (the therapist feels the painful affects of the patient), 
processing (the therapist digests, contains, interprets, and returns in a different form the contents 
of the most painful fears and feelings), and integration (the painful feelings are, with the help of 
the therapist, felt to be more tolerable, splitting is lessened, the personality becomes richer and 
fuller, real relationships and learning are more possible). In this scenario the clinician -- as a 
good object who helps contain thoughts and feelings that before seemed unbearable, who 
survives the hateful attacks of the patient, and who verbalizes the (often terrifying) tender and 
loving feelings the patient has for the clinician and vice versa –is, over time, internalized so that 
he or she can be consciously and unconsciously drawn upon for strength in future difficult times.  
Consideration of implications for social work practice 
 The study of psychoanalytic envy has significant implications for clinical social work 
practice. Implications can be divided into (1) clinical training/preparation, (2) how to structure 
treatments, and (3) interventions to make during the course of treatment.   
Clinical training and preparation 
 The study of psychoanalytic envy through the work of Klein and Bion shows the 
incredible complexity of the forces that shape cognitive and emotional development and further, 
begs the question of how clinicians can learn and develop in order to effectively treat this type of 
patient. Treatment for the envious patient requires conscious and cognitive maturity on the part 
of the clinician as well as solid emotional development. Conscious and cognitive development 
comes from the study of related literature and from comprehensive training in various theories. It 
involves a process of understanding increasing amounts and numbers of theory, seeing those 
theories come to life in practice, and ultimately, noting where any given theory applies or does 
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not apply.  The clinician who is to tackle such a deep and complex subject as envy in his or her 
patient must be well-equipped theoretically; if not, it will be easy to attempt to change behavior 
without understanding underlying causes. According to Kleinian and Bionian formulations, this 
will never work; that is, this approach will never go deep enough such that the difficult and taboo 
feelings can be integrated and processed while envy and its accompanying behaviors soften.  
 Perhaps even more importantly and sometimes ignored is that the clinician who is to be 
effective in treating the envious patient must develop his or her emotional/intuitive capacities. In 
short, he or she must become more self-aware; if not, the projective processes of the patient will 
be misunderstood, inspiring retaliation on the part of the clinician, which is the absolute worst 
outcome when the envious patient is attempting to show the therapist an internal ruin that must 
be contained, not punished. Thus, the clinician must have his or her own experience in 
psychotherapy or psychoanalysis.  Knowing that the lived experience of better integrating one’s 
love and hate, feeling the intensity of the transference, and seeing how something felt to be 
dangerous alone can be contained and digested by another is critical to being able to do the work.  
 Perhaps reading theory can be included in both cognitive and emotional development. 
Learning from the work of others gives the clinician who works with the envious patient 
information (for example, about envy’s connections with shame and guilt and why that is the 
case or with envy’s corrosiveness, stripping meaning from personal growth). For example, the 
process of reading the work of writers like Klein and Bion is in some way an experience of 
emotional growth. There is a struggle to understand, as there is in clinical work, all of the 
intricacies. There can be also a frustration at not understanding, a wish to magically “know 
already,” and a desire to give up on the whole project. That process is important practice for 
working with people who will be mysterious in sometimes beautiful but often frustrating ways. 
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Thus, the clinician-reader learns to tolerate ambiguity and search for meaning even when it does 
not come quickly or effortlessly.  
How to structure treatments 
 Both Klein and Bion are clear that deep work on difficult issues does not happen quickly. 
It requires significant clinical time, for the patient and clinician to develop a relationship in 
which terrible feelings and experiences can be contained, their content then altered so they can 
be re-introjected more safely. Particularly in the case of the envious patient, exactly what is good 
(the empathy, insight, consistency of the therapist) may be attacked more viciously than anything 
else. Those attacks must be withstood, and the good thing must continue to be offered, so that 
over time the attacks soften, and the clinician can be taken into the patient’s harsh internal world 
as a good object from which the patient can draw. Losses (particularly never-had-loss of the 
containing object in infancy that contributed to the envy) must be mourned. Love and hate, 
which may bring up shame and guilt and other difficult affects for the person, need time in order 
to become more integrated. Projective processes must be understood, so that the patient can 
develop a more realistic sense of his or her relationships and external realities. The envious 
patient is fragile, without consistent good internal objects from which to draw in times of 
difficulty. In order for the clinician to become a good object who can be internalized, the 
clinician must be consistently present, withstand and try to understand the patient’s hate (which 
may be dangerously split-off), and come to have a relationship with the patient in which strong 
affects and painful experiences can be survived and seen as learning tools.  
Thus, the structure of the therapy must include the consistent and ample time necessary 
for all of this to take place. The work must include individual psychotherapy or psychoanalysis, 
at least once a week, but ideally more often than that. Treating a deep, painful problem such as 
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envy will likely mean a treatment that is measured in years, not months or weeks. Group 
treatment in which interpersonal interactions on a larger scale may be better understood and 
practiced may be helpful after some progress is made in the individual work.  
Interventions to make during the course of individual treatment 
 In addition to the clinician’s training and development and the structure of treatment, 
certain interventions can help the therapist to effectively treat someone who suffers from envy. 
Consistency, empathic presence, and the strength to withstand attacks on the clinician and the 
process are all crucial foundations for the work.  Helpful interventions can be made verbally or 
non-verbally. Verbally, the therapist must relentlessly interpret the negative transference and the 
positive transference; both must be accepted and neither prioritized. Too often hate has no place 
in the consulting room although sometimes, its acceptance there is crucial to healing and 
integration. The therapist must be careful, however, of defenses and shame.  Klein in particular 
cautions against interpreting something taboo that has been repressed for good reason and that is 
very painful. Interpreting envy too quickly, therefore, may cause irreparable harm in the 
therapeutic relationship. Interestingly, envy may never even have to be called envy verbally in 
the session, as it carries such shame-inducing connotations. Yet, through the processes described 
in this thesis, it is thought about, addressed, and treated in the therapeutic encounter.  
 Non-verbal interventions, while more difficult to conceptualize, are also critical to this 
kind of treatment. Throughout the process the patient brings his or her most unbearable feelings 
and experiences. The clinician must be affected and feel the unbearable feelings while keeping a 
piece of himself or herself on the side of something more neutral. The feelings are then held, 
processed, survived. Because the clinician’s holding of the feelings and experience will have an 
effect, it will be his or her learning -- emotional and cognitive -- that will help him or her to 
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manage such experiences, which brings us back to the need for a solid theoretical base for this 
type of practice.    
Conclusion 
 Any clinician who has come into contact with someone who seems to have a harsh, 
internal world full of persecutors, who attacks and makes meaningless their own growth and 
development, and who cannot be satisfied by anything material knows that this person is very 
difficult to treat. Many theorists have worked on envy from a variety of perspectives, exploring 
its causes and linking it with other emotional, cognitive, and behavioral phenomena. Melanie 
Klein and Wilfred Bion, two of the most important theorists in psychoanalysis and on the subject 
of envy, go deep into the concept. They explore the earliest, most infantile roots of envy, creating 
innovative theories to explain why the infant may become envious and what that experience will 
look like in childhood and adulthood. They recognize the meaning in even attacks on meaning 
itself, knowing that sometimes the clinician must hold the meaning when the patient cannot. And 
they describe theory that can help the clinician to make sense of the confusion, the attacks on 
what is good, the corrosive emptiness of the envious patient such that it can all be organized in 
treatment.   
 Klein and Bion have much to contribute to a deep understanding of envy and its 
treatment and indeed, the very practice of reading creative and complex theoreticians who refuse 
to simplify intricate phenomena helps the clinician to develop a sense of patience with not 
knowing and perhaps even a sense of wonder at the many possibilities of human development. 
On a very practical level, Kleinian and Bionian theory on the conceptualization and treatment of 
envy may help clinicians to better help patients who are struggling to soften their shame and 
guilt, to more fully integrate their love and hate, to better grieve their losses and the lack of 
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sufficient containers for their greatest fears, and ultimately, to build up a stronger internal world 
from which to draw in their continued development.  
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